

# Maximize Utility Subject to $R \leq 1$ : A Simple Price-Theory Approach to Covid-19 Lockdown and Reopening Policy

Eric Budish  
Chicago Booth

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- ▶ At the same time, *very* different policy implications



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    - ▶ Masks, Rapid Tests, 6 feet of distance, etc.
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    - ▶ Society can do more activity, enjoy more utility, while keeping  $R \leq 1$
- ▶ Overall, optimal way to get to  $R \leq 1$ 
  - ▶ Use masks, tests, etc. (except where reduction is trivial)
  - ▶ Then targeted activity bans

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    - ▶ Lockdown is not very creative
    - ▶ Many more creative ways to reduce risk while allowing greater utility
    - ▶ Once the goal is not minimize, interventions need not be perfect to be valuable!




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- ▶ But: safe to say that society did not converge on “Max Utility s.t.  $R \leq 1$ ”

# Why $R \leq 1$ : Exponential Growth



Note: Output is based on the standard SIR model. Each line depicts a different initial infection seed. The  $\gamma$  parameter is fixed throughout at  $1/5$ , which represents a duration of infectiousness of 5 days. The  $\beta$  parameter, which represents the rate of infectiousness, is varied such that  $R_0 = \beta/\gamma$  is the value depicted along the horizontal axis.

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
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- ▶ Aside on new variant
  - ▶ Suppose  $R_0$  is 4.0 instead
  - ▶ Then need a 3/4 reduction (i.e.,  $\frac{4-1}{4} = \frac{3}{4}$ )
  - ▶ Again, not crazy

# Is $R \leq 1$ Optimal? Simple Price Theory



## Is $R \leq 1$ Enough? Too Much?

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  - ▶ If current Infected population already very high then may want a period of  $R \ll 1$  to reduce Infected pop'n, then transition to  $R \leq 1$ , to satisfactorily approximate health objective in (2)
  - ▶ “Hammer and Dance”, AEI “Road Map to Reopening”
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  - ▶ This formulation implicitly assumes mortality rate is high and Susceptible population is high.
  - ▶ If not then  $R \leq 1$  likely too restrictive
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- ▶ I will come back to both of these issues towards the end of the talk

## Basic Model Setup

- ▶ Society chooses a vector of activities  $x \in X = [0, 1]^n$ . For each activity  $i$ :
  - ▶ Utility  $v_i$ : traditional economic benefits and costs,  $v_i$  and  $c_i$
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- ▶  $R \leq 1$  as a constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x_i} \quad & \sum_{i=1}^n x_i (v_i - c_i) \quad (5) \\ \text{subject to} \quad & \sum_{i=1}^n x_i r_i \leq 1 \end{aligned}$$

## Max Utility s.t. $R \leq 1$ : Solution

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$$\rho_i = \frac{(v_i - c_i)}{r_i}$$

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
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  - ▶ optimum sorts not by *absolute* risk, but by utility per unit of risk

## Solving the Basic Model: Graphic Depiction



# Simple Interventions

- ▶ We know a lot about how Covid-19 spreads
- ▶ Relatively simple interventions can reduce risk meaningfully at low cost to utility
  - ▶ Examples: face-masks, physical distance, testing, handwashing, stay-home-if-sick



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- ▶ Thus: *allows society to engage in more activity and achieve more utility while staying within  $R \leq 1$  budget*

## “Optimal Masks”

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  - ▶ Changing over time as understanding improves
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
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
- ▶ The optimal mask policy for activity  $i$  maximizes

$$\underbrace{\Delta r_i}_{\text{risk reduction from mask}} \cdot \underbrace{\rho^*}_{\text{marginal value of risk budget}} - \underbrace{\Delta u_i}_{\text{utility harm of mask}}$$

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  - ▶ Consider range of 2.0-4.0
- ▶ “Masks” reduce risk by anywhere from 30-70%
  - ▶ Abaluck et al, Hatzius et al: cloth face-masks alone on order of 20-50% reduction
  - ▶ Chu et al, Howard et al, meta-analyses (labs, hospitals, ecological)
  - ▶ Romer mass tests
  - ▶ Other rapid test variations
  - ▶ Also: distance, hand-washing, etc.

## Optimum without Simple Interventions

	<b>Value of <math>R_0</math></b>				
	2.0	2.5	3.0	3.5	4.0
To Achieve $R \leq 1$ :					
% Activities Dropped	37.5	45.0	50.0	53.7	56.7
% Pre-Virus Utility Dropped	18.8	27.0	33.3	38.3	42.3
Relative to Pre-Virus Economy:					
% Activities Kept	62.5	55.0	50.0	46.3	43.3
% Utility Kept	81.2	73.0	66.7	61.7	57.7

## Optimum with Simple Interventions

### Main $R_0$ Scenario

	No Masks	Mask Efficacy				
		30%	40%	50%	60%	70%
$R$ if all activities are kept	2.50	1.75	1.50	1.25	1.00	0.75
To achieve $R \leq 1$ :						
% Activities Dropped	45.0	32.1	25.0	15.0	0.0	0.0
% Pre-Virus Utility Dropped	27.0	13.8	8.3	3.0	0.0	0.0
Society % of Pre-Virus Utility:						
if Masks Reduce Utility by 0%	73.0	86.2	91.7	97.0	100.0	100.0
if Masks Reduce Utility by 10%	N/A	77.6	82.5	87.3	90.0	90.0

Note: The term "Masks" is used to denote the set of Simple Interventions including face-masks, tests, social distance, etc.

# Optimum with Simple Interventions

## High $R_0$ Scenario

	No Masks	Mask Efficacy				
		30%	40%	50%	60%	70%
$R$ if all activities are kept	4.00	2.80	2.40	2.00	1.60	1.20
To achieve $R \leq 1$ :						
% Activities Dropped	56.7	48.2	43.7	37.5	28.1	12.5
% Pre-Virus Utility Dropped	42.3	31.0	25.5	18.8	10.5	2.1
Society % of Pre-Virus Utility:						
if Masks Reduce Utility by 0%	57.7	69.0	74.5	81.2	89.5	97.9
if Masks Reduce Utility by 10%	N/A	62.1	67.0	73.1	80.5	88.1

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
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### Low $R_0$ Scenario


	Mask Efficacy					
	No Masks	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%
$R$ if all activities are kept	2.00	1.40	1.20	1.00	0.80	0.60
To achieve $R \leq 1$ :						
% Activities Dropped	37.5	21.4	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
% Pre-Virus Utility Dropped	18.8	6.1	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Society % of Pre-Virus Utility:						
if Masks Reduce Utility by 0%	81.2	93.9	97.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
if Masks Reduce Utility by 10%	N/A	84.5	88.1	90.0	90.0	90.0

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## Effect of Simple Interventions on Keep/Drop



# Effect on the Economic Cost of Mitigation






## Discussion: is $R \leq 1$ Enough? Too Much?

- ▶ Is  $R \leq 1$  Enough?
  - ▶ If stock of infections is high
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
## Discussion: is $R \leq 1$ Enough? Too Much?

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- ▶ Is  $R \leq 1$  Too Much?
  - ▶ “Herd immunity”: if  $R > 1$ , then eventually 200+ million infections
  - ▶ Initially there was a lot of uncertainty about infection fatality rate and rates of severe cases
  - ▶ With what we know now: the more credible case to consider is a “Young-Old” strategy, along the lines of Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, Werning and Whinston (also Great Barrington Declaration)


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
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
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
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


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




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


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


# “Young-Old” Argument

Panel A: Old Population



Panel B: Young Population



## Conclusion: A New Play in the Pandemic Playbook?

Four features of Covid-19, relative to past pandemics, that justifies a new approach:

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- ▶ Recall: even  $R = 1.5 \rightarrow 200$  million infections in 12 months

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## 2. Eradication likely not feasible

- ▶ By the time of policy intervention, eradication unrealistic for many countries
- ▶ (If eradication were feasible: like a one-time fixed cost, versus ongoing costs of containment)

## Conclusion: A New Play in the Pandemic Playbook?

Four features of Covid-19, relative to past pandemics, that justifies a new approach:

### 3. $R \leq 1$ feasible with modestly expensive measures

- ▶ Medical experts quickly converged on a suite of public-health responses
- ▶ Atul Gawande: “if you have hygiene, distancing, mandatory masks, and screen everybody for symptoms so that they stay home and get tested, that shuts the virus down”

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
### 4. Minimize unboundedly expensive

- ▶ When eradication is infeasible, second-best is “minimize” (Osterholm)
- ▶ However, hard to think about tradeoffs *if the interventions themselves are very expensive*
- ▶ Useful contrast: HIV




# Infectious-Threat Playbook


Panel A:  $R \leq 1$  is Optimal




Panel B:  $R \leq 1$  with Simple Interventions




Panel C: Optimal to Ignore




Panel D: Optimal to Partially Mitigate



Panel E: Optimal to Suppress to  $R \ll 1$




Panel F: Optimal to Eradicate




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
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
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
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
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Panel E: Optimal to Suppress to  $R \ll 1$



# Infectious-Threat Playbook

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- ▶ That is, contain the exponential growth as efficiently as possible
- ▶ Final point: this paper, at most, puts economics language on a formulation many others converged on as well
- ▶ Hopefully we will do a better job in the next pandemic.