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The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus

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Abstract.

The purpose of a consensus protocol is to keep a distributed network of nodes “in sync,” even in the presence of an unpredictable communication network and adversarial behavior by some of the participating nodes. In the permissionless setting relevant to modern blockchain protocols, these nodes may be operated by a large number of unknown players, with each player free to use multiple identifiers and to start or stop running the protocol at any time. Establishing that a permissionless consensus protocol is “secure” thus requires both a distributed computing argument (that the protocol guarantees consistency and liveness unless the fraction of adversarial participation is sufficiently large) and an economic argument (that carrying out an attack would be prohibitively expensive for a potential attacker). There is a mature toolbox for assembling arguments of the former type; the goal of this paper is to lay the foundations for arguments of the latter type. For example, the Ethereum protocol is oft-claimed to be “more economically secure” after “the merge,” meaning in its current proof-of-stake incarnation relative to the (proof-of-work) original. What, formally, does this assertion mean? Is it true? Could there be alternative protocols that are “still more economically secure” than Ethereum? How do the answers depend on the assumptions imposed on, for example, the reliability of message delivery or the active participation of non-malicious players? An ideal permissionless consensus protocol would, in addition to satisfying standard consistency and liveness guarantees, render consistency violations prohibitively expensive for the attacker without collateral damage to honest participants—for example, by programatically confiscating an attacker’s resources without

reducing the value of honest participants' resources, as is the intention for slashing in a proof-of-stake protocol. We make this idea precise with our notion of the EAAC (expensive to attack in the absence of collapse) property and prove the following results: (1) In the synchronous and dynamically available setting (in which the communication network is reliable but nonmalicious players may be periodically inactive), with an adversary that controls at least one-half of the overall resources, no protocol can be EAAC. In particular, this result rules out EAAC for all typical longest-chain protocols (be they proof-of-work or proof-of-stake). (2) In the partially synchronous and quasi-permissionless setting (in which resource-controlling non-malicious players are always active but the communication network may suffer periods of unreliability), with an adversary that controls at least one-third of the overall resources, no protocol can be EAAC. In particular, slashing in a proof-of-stake protocol cannot achieve its intended purpose if message delays cannot be bounded a priori. (3) In the synchronous and quasi-permissionless setting, there is a proof-of-stake protocol with slashing that, provided the adversary controls less than two-thirds of the overall stake, satisfies the EAAC property. Thus, while only "classical security" is possible in the dynamically available or partially synchronous settings, proof-of-stake protocols with slashing can obtain additional "economic security" in the quasi-permissionless and synchronous settings. All three results are optimal with respect to the size of the adversary. With respect to Ethereum, our work formalizes the potential security benefits of proof-of-stake sybil-resistance coupled with slashing and the common belief that the merge has increased Ethereum's economic security. Our work also provides mathematical justifications for several key design decisions behind the post-merge Ethereum protocol, ranging from long cooldown periods for unstaking to economic penalties for inactivity.

Keywords

distributed computing

blockchain protocols

Ethereum

proof-of-stake

Byzantine agreement

cryptoeconomic security

MSC codes

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1. Introduction.

1.1. The security of permissionless consensus protocols.

The core functionality of a blockchain protocol such as Bitcoin or Ethereum is *permissionless consensus*, with a potentially large and ever-evolving set of participants kept in sync on the state of

the blockchain via a consensus protocol. Compared to the traditional setting of permissioned consensus protocols (with a fixed and known participant set), permissionless protocols must cope with three novel challenges (cf. [33]):

- **The unknown players challenge.** The set of participants is unknown at the time of protocol deployment and is of unknown size.
- **The player inactivity challenge.** Participants can start or stop running the protocol at any time.
- **The sybil challenge.** One participant may masquerade as many by using many identifiers (a.k.a. “sybils”).

Reasoning about the security of a *permissioned* consensus protocol is, to a large extent, a purely computer science question. (Here “security” means that the protocol satisfies both liveness and consistency—as long as there’s work to be done it gets done, and without any two participants ever committing to conflicting decisions.) Consider, for example, a corporation that wants to grant customers access to a database while keeping its downtime percentage to 0.0001%. One approach would be to replicate the database on many different servers and use a consensus protocol to keep those replicas in sync. How many replicas are necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired uptime? Or, in two parts:

- (Q1) For a given value of k , how many replicas $n(k)$ are necessary and sufficient to guarantee security even when k of the replicas have failed?
- (Q2) For a given target downtime percentage δ , what is the smallest value of k such that the probability that at least $k + 1$ of $n(k)$ replicas fail simultaneously is at most δ ?

The distributing computing literature resolves question (Q1) for a staggering variety of settings (with $n(k) = 2k + 1$ and $n(k) = 3k + 1$ being two of the most common answers); see, e.g., [11, 35] for an introduction. Given a probabilistic model of replica failures, question (Q2) then boils down to a calculation, providing the corporation with the appropriate value of k and the corresponding number $n(k)$ of servers that it should buy.

Reasoning about the security of a *permissionless* consensus protocol fundamentally requires the synthesis of computer science and economic arguments. First, the sybil challenge generally forces such a protocol to measure “size” in terms of some resource that is, unlike identifiers, scarce and therefore costly. Common examples include hashrate (as in a proof-of-work protocol) and staked cryptocurrency (as in a proof-of-stake protocol). Second, while misbehaving replicas in a permissioned protocol are generally attributed to hardware failures and software bugs, permissionless protocols must tolerate deliberately malicious behavior by a motivated attacker (a hacker, designers of a competing protocol, or even an unfriendly nation-state). The analogues of questions (Q1) and (Q2) are then the following:

- (Q3) What is the largest value of ρ for which a protocol can guarantee security even when a ρ fraction of the costly resource is controlled by an attacker?
- (Q4) How unlikely is it that an attacker controls more than a ρ fraction of the costly resource and then carries out an attack?

Question (Q3) is well defined, and the last decade of research on blockchain protocols has answered it in a range of settings. Question (Q4) makes no sense without an economic model for the cost of carrying out an attack. The goal of this paper is to develop a mathematical framework for quantifying this cost and for designing permissionless consensus protocols in which this cost is as large as possible.

1.2. The economic consequences of an attack: Scorched earth vs. targeted punishment.

In the Bitcoin white paper, Nakamoto [36] noted that an attacker controlling 51% of the overall hashrate could force consistency violations and thereby carry out double-spend attacks, but suggested that the consequent economic cost might make such an attack unprofitable:

If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his payments or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favor him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.

This argument rests on the assumption that a double-spend attack would cause a significant and permanent drop in the USD-denominated market price of Bitcoin's native currency BTC, with the attacker then foregoing most of the USD-denominated value of the future BTC block rewards that it's positioned to receive.

More recently, this initial narrative around the security of Bitcoin and other proof-of-work blockchain protocols has evolved into a second narrative. The "CPUs" that Nakamoto referred to have been almost entirely replaced by ASICs that serve no purpose other than to evaluate a hard-coded cryptographic hash function such as SHA-256. Now the story goes: if an attacker with 51% of the hashrate were to carry out a double-spend attack on (say) the Bitcoin protocol, the Bitcoin ecosystem could respond with the "nuclear option," changing the cryptographic hash function used for proof-of-work mining via a coordinated upgrade to the protocol (a "hard fork"). Such an upgrade would render existing ASICs useless, leaving the attacker with a defunct pile of scrap metal. Hopefully, the mere threat of this nuclear option would deter any potential attackers, and the option would never have to actually be exercised.

An alarming aspect of both narratives is the "scorched earth" nature of an attack's consequences: honest participants (passive holders of BTC or ASIC-owning honest miners, respectively) are harmed as much as the attacker. Is scorched earth-style punishment fundamental to permissionless consensus or an artifact of the specific design decisions made in Bitcoin and other proof-of-work protocols?

Ideally, a blockchain protocol could punish an attacker that carries out a double-spend attack in a targeted and non-scorched-earth way, leaving honest participants unharmed. The hope for such "asymmetric punishment" has long rested with proof-of-stake blockchain protocols, in which the

“power” of a participant is proportional to how much of the protocol’s native currency they have locked up in a designated staking contract. Intuitively, with the scarce and costly resource controlled directly by the protocol (rather than “off-chain,” as with hashrate), such a protocol is positioned to directly and surgically confiscate resources from specific participants (perhaps as part of a hard fork, or perhaps programmatically as part of the protocol’s normal operation) [6, 30].

The Ethereum protocol, which famously migrated from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake (among many other changes) in September 2022 in an event known as “the merge,” offers an interesting case study. Ethereum’s lead founder, Vitalik Buterin, wrote in the early design stages that “The ‘one-sentence philosophy’ of proof of stake is ...‘security comes from putting up economic value-at-loss’” [8] and “The intention is to make 51% attacks extremely expensive, so that even a majority of validators working together cannot roll back finalized blocks without undertaking an extremely large economic loss” [9]. Today, post-merge, the protocol’s official documents echo the aspirations above, asserting that “proof-of-stake offers greater crypto-economic security than proof-of-work” and “economic penalties for misbehavior make 51% style attacks more costly for an attacker compared to proof-of-work.”¹ What would be a rigorous phrasing of these assertions? Are they true? Could there be alternative protocols – perhaps wildly different from the proof-of-work or proof-of-stake protocols considered to date – that are “still more economically secure” than Ethereum? How do the answers depend on the assumptions imposed on, for example, the reliability of message delivery or the active participation of non-malicious players?

1.3. Overview of results.

Defining the cost of an attack. We augment the permissionless consensus framework of Lewis-Pye and Roughgarden [33] with a new model for reasoning about the cost of causing consistency violations. Informally, we call such an attack *cheap* if the attacker suffers no economic consequences following the consistency violation, and *expensive* otherwise. We call the attack *expensive due to collapse* if the attacker is harmed for the wrong (“scorched earth”) reasons, with honest protocol participants also suffering, as in the two narratives around the security of proof-of-work protocols described in section 1.2. We call the attack *expensive in the absence of collapse* if the attacker is harmed for the right reasons—targeted punishment that avoids collateral damage to the honest participants, as is the goal of slashing in a proof-of-stake protocol. Our key definition is that of an *EAAC* protocol (for “expensive to attack in the absence of collapse”) which states, informally, that every attack on the protocol is expensive in the absence of collapse. We then interpret a protocol that guarantees the EAAC property as “more economically secure” than one that does not. We next survey the three main results in this paper (depicted in Figure 1)—two that identify settings in which only “classical security” is possible, and a third showing that, under appropriate assumptions, proof-of-stake protocols with slashing can indeed obtain additional “economic security.”


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Fig. 1. Summary of main results. While only “classical security” is achievable in the dynamically available setting (in which non-malicious players may be periodically inactive) or the partially synchronous setting (in which the communication network may suffer unbounded periods of unreliability), proof-of-stake protocols with slashing can achieve additional “economic security” in the quasi-permissionless and synchronous setting.

Impossibility of EAAC in the dynamically available setting. Our first main result (Theorem 4.1) states that, in the synchronous and dynamically available setting (in which the communication network is reliable but non-malicious players may be periodically inactive), with an adversary that controls at least one-half of the overall resources, no protocol can be EAAC. This result is optimal with respect to the size of the adversary, as the Bitcoin protocol (among others) guarantees (probabilistic) consistency and liveness in the synchronous and dynamically available setting when the adversary controls less than one-half of the overall hashrate [25] and is thus vacuously EAAC in this case (Figure 2). In particular, this result rules out non-trivial EAAC guarantees for all typical longest-chain protocols (be they proof-of-work protocols like Bitcoin or proof-of-stake protocols such as Ouroboros [28] and Snow White [19]).


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Fig. 2. *Theorem 4.1. No non-trivial EAAC guarantees are possible in the dynamically available setting, even with synchronous communication: once an adversary is large enough to cause consistency violations, it is also large enough to avoid asymmetric punishment. A p -bounded adversary is one that controls at most a p fraction of each resource (such as hashrate or stake) used by a protocol.*

To give the flavor of the proof, consider two disjoint sets of players X and Y that each own an equal amount of resources. Liveness in the dynamically available setting implies that if one of these sets never hears from the other, it must forge ahead and continue to confirm transactions (as all players in the other set might well be honest but inactive). So imagine that the players in X are malicious (a $\frac{1}{2}$ -bounded adversary), don't talk to Y , and behave as if they were honest and never heard from Y , confirming transactions to themselves that conflict with the transactions confirmed by Y during the same period. Now suppose that, at some later point, players in X disseminate all the messages that they would have disseminated if honest in their simulated execution. At this point, because of the symmetry between X and Y , it is not possible for late-arriving players to determine whether the players in X or the players in Y are honest. If the protocol happens to make this particular attack expensive (by harming the players in X), there is a symmetric execution (with the players in X honest and those in Y malicious) in which the honest players are the ones who are harmed.

Impossibility of EAAC in the partially synchronous setting. Our second result (Theorem 4.2) states that, in the partially synchronous and quasi-permissionless setting (in which resource-controlling non-malicious players are always active but the communication network may suffer periods of unreliability), with an adversary that controls at least one-third of the overall resources, no protocol can be EAAC.² (In fact, something stronger is true: no protocol can make consistency violations expensive for the attacker, even allowing for collateral damage to honest players.) In particular, slashing in a proof-of-stake protocol cannot achieve its intended purpose if message delays cannot be bounded a priori. This result is optimal with respect to the size of the adversary, as there is a proof-of-stake PBFT-style protocol that guarantees consistency and liveness in the partially synchronous and quasi-permissionless setting when the adversary controls less than one-third of the overall stake [33], which is therefore vacuously EAAC in that regime (Figure 3).




Fig. 3. *Theorem 4.2. No non-trivial EAAC guarantees are possible with partially synchronous communication, even in the quasi-permissionless setting: once an adversary is large enough to cause consistency violations, it is also large enough to avoid (even symmetric) punishment.*


To give a sense of the proof of this result, consider three sets of players X , Y , and Z , all with equal resources, with the players in X and Z honest and the players in Y malicious. Suppose that messages disseminated by players in X are received by players in $X \cup Y$ right away but not by players in Z for a very long time (which is a possibility in the partially synchronous model). Symmetrically, suppose Y and Z but not X promptly receive messages sent by players in Z . Suppose further that the malicious players in Y pretend to the players in X that they've never heard from anyone in Z and to the players in Z that they've never heard from anyone in X . Because $X \cup Y$ and $Y \cup Z$ each contain two-thirds of the overall resources, liveness (with respect to a $\frac{1}{3}$ -bounded adversary) dictates that the players in X and the players in Z must each forge ahead and confirm transactions, even though no messages between players in X and Z have been delivered yet. These uncoordinated confirmed transactions will generally conflict, resulting in a consistency violation. Moreover, this violation may not be noticed by the players of X and Z for a very long time (again due to the arbitrarily long delays in the partially synchronous model), giving the players of Y the opportunity to sell off their resources and avoid any possible punishment in the meantime.

Possibility of EAAC in the synchronous and quasi-permissionless setting. Our final result (Theorem 5.1) states that, in the synchronous and quasi-permissionless setting, there is a proof-of-stake protocol with slashing that, provided the adversary controls less than two-thirds of the overall stake, satisfies the EAAC property.³ In fact, our protocol is designed for a version of the synchronous setting defined by two known parameters: one parameter Δ that represents typical network speed, perhaps on the order of milliseconds or seconds; and a second parameter Δ^* that represents the time required for players to communicate when the network is unreliable (whether over the network or by out-of-band coordination), perhaps on the order of minutes.⁴ Intuitively, when there's no attack, the protocol operates at a speed proportional to Δ ; under attack, it recovers at a speed proportional to Δ^* .

More precisely, we give a protocol that (i) is live and consistent in the partially synchronous setting (with respect to the parameter Δ), provided the adversary controls less than one-third of the overall stake (and even if synchrony does not hold for Δ^*); and (ii) is EAAC so long as the adversary controls less than two-thirds of the overall stake and message delays are no larger than Δ^* .

Our motivation for considering the two time bounds Δ and Δ^* is as follows. In practical settings, partial synchrony may hold with respect to Δ of the order of a few hundred milliseconds. It may also be reasonable to suppose that synchrony will hold with respect to some much larger bound Δ^* , but making direct use of this larger bound to run a synchronous protocol during standard operation would result in an impractically slow protocol. Our use of the two bounds Δ and Δ^* reflects our interest in considering protocols that give *all* the usual guarantees of protocols for partial synchrony (with no requirement that the larger bound Δ^* should hold), but which *also* give recovery guarantees in the case that the larger bound for synchrony should hold.

A recent result of Tas et al. [45], when translated to our model, implies that our result is optimal with respect to the size of the adversary: even in the permissioned and synchronous setting, if a protocol guarantees liveness with respect to an adversary that controls less than one-third of the overall resources, it cannot guarantee EAAC with respect to an adversary that controls at least two-thirds of the overall resources (Figure 4).



Achieving asymmetric punishment via slashing in a proof-of-stake protocol would seem to require addressing the following challenges:

1. There should be a “smoking gun” behind every consistency violation in the form of a “certificate of guilt” that identifies (at least some of) the Byzantine players responsible for the violation.
2. All honest players should learn such a certificate of guilt after a consistency violation, before the adversary has had the opportunity to cash out its assets.
3. Given the receipt of a certificate of guilt, honest players should be able to reach consensus on a new (post-slashing) state.

Further, the second and third challenges must be met despite interference from an adversary that is so large as to be able to cause consistency violations.

At a very high level, our protocol resolves these three challenges as follows. (Section 6 provides a more technical overview of the protocol, with the full details deferred to section 9. The protocol is designed to be as simple as possible subject to a non-trivial EAAC guarantee; optimizing the performance of such protocols is an interesting direction for future work.) Some PBFT-style protocols provide certificates of guilt in the form of votes on conflicting blocks, and accordingly our starting point is the Tendermint protocol [2, 3]. (Extending the permissioned Tendermint protocol to a proof-of-stake protocol with guaranteed consistency and liveness in the quasi-permissionless setting is non-trivial, but we show that it can be done.) The standard Tendermint protocol uses two stages of voting per view, and we show that this fails to guarantee the receipt of certificates of guilt by honest players before the adversary has cashed out its assets. On the other hand, we show that, provided the adversary controls less than two-thirds of the stake, three stages of voting suffice for the prompt dissemination of certificates of guilt. Finally, after a consistency violation, honest players attempt to reach consensus on an updated genesis block (in which slashing has been carried out) using a variant of the Dolev–Strong protocol [21].

The trade-off between liveness and the EAAC property. Thus far, our discussion of Theorem 5.1 assumes that we require protocols to be live and consistent in the partially synchronous setting, provided the adversary controls less than one-third of the overall stake. A standard technique (which just modifies the definition of a “quorum certificate” to require votes from a larger proportion of relevant players) can be used to extend the regime in which our protocol is EAAC beyond the $2/3$ bound at the expense of reducing liveness resilience: If the protocol is required to be live for adversaries that are ρ_l -bounded (for some $\rho_l < 1/3$), then it can be made EAAC when the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1 - \rho_l$. See section 9 for further details.

Interpretation for Ethereum. Our results make precise a number of common beliefs about the Ethereum protocol (post-merge). Most obviously, our work formalizes the potential security benefits of proof-of-stake sybil-resistance coupled with slashing logic.

Our impossibility result for the dynamically available setting (Theorem 4.1) shows that provable slashing guarantees are impossible both for any protocol that relies on only off-chain resources (such as proof-of-work protocols) and for any standard longest-chain protocol (even if it is a proof-of-stake protocol).⁵ Thus, two of the biggest changes made to the Ethereum protocol during the merge—the switch from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake, and the addition of the Casper “finality gadget” [10] to what had previously been a pure “longest-chain” protocol—are both necessary for provable slashing guarantees (neither change alone would enable asymmetric punishment). Our result also provides a justification for the “inactivity leaks” used in the Ethereum protocol to punish seemingly inactive players, which can be viewed as an economic mechanism for enforcing the (necessary) assumptions of the quasi-permissionless setting.

Our impossibility result for the partially synchronous setting (Theorem 4.2) justifies the common assumption that honest Ethereum validators could, in the case of emergency, communicate out of band within some known finite amount of time. Further, this result justifies the long “cooldown period” for unstaking in post-merge Ethereum, with a delay that is roughly proportional to the assumed time required for out-of-band communication.

The protocol we design to prove our positive result (Theorem 5.1) resembles post-merge Ethereum in several high-level respects: the use of proof-of-stake sybil-resistance, an accountable PBFT-type approach to consensus (in our case, Tendermint rather than Casper), slashing for asymmetric punishment, equal-size validators, and regularly scheduled updates to the validator set. One notable difference is our protocol’s reliance on three stages of voting to ensure the prompt dissemination of certificates of guilt, for the reasons discussed in section 9.3.

1.4. Discussion.

The requirement for consensus after a consistency violation. The requirement for consensus on a new post-slashing state (challenge (3) from section 1.3) might initially seem to make the conclusions of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 immediate. For example, if consensus is not possible when the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho \geq 1/3$ in partial synchrony, and if the EAAC property requires the ability to reach consensus, then shouldn’t the conclusion of Theorem 4.2 be automatic? This not true because the guaranteed existence of certificates of guilt (without consensus on precisely which certificates of guilt exist) can be useful in the process of reaching consensus. For example, if using a standard BFT-style protocol to achieve consensus, the existence of certificates of guilt may be used to redefine what counts as a valid “quorum.” After a consistency violation, a proposed block may include certificates of guilt for $1/3$ of the stake, and then one might consider a “quorum” of votes for that block to be $2/3$ of the *remaining* stake. In fact, Theorem 4.2 holds due to economic considerations (the ability of the adversary to cash out of their position before punishment) rather than any impossibility of consensus for partial synchrony. That is, the impossibility result is driven by the fact that an adversary controlling $1/3$ of the stake may cause a consistency violation and then cash out of their position before the violation is detected by honest participants.⁶ Similar considerations apply for the dynamically available setting; i.e., standard impossibility results don’t apply in a context where honest players may eventually receive certificates of guilt for some Byzantine players.

The economic cost of controlling resources. This paper follows the tradition of Nakamoto [36] (as in the quote in section 1.2), among many others, in concentrating on the economic consequences to an attacker of causing a consistency violation (e.g., in order to execute a double-spend attack) in a permissionless consensus protocol. Our focus complements previous work of Budish [4, 5], which provides an economic model for quantifying the cost that a potential attacker must absorb to control sufficient resources to be able to cause a consistency violation. The main conclusion in Budish [4, 5] is that, for the current major blockchain protocols, this cost is surprisingly cheap, scaling as a flow cost rather than a stock cost (see below for more details). This analysis suggests that the economic consequences that *follow* an attack are the ones with the greatest potential to deter an attacker and in this sense provides strong economic justification for the focus of this paper.

Budish's analysis. Some readers may find it instructive to reinterpret “expensive” and “cheap” attacks in the “stock vs. flow” language of Budish [4, 5]; other readers can skip this paragraph and the next without loss of continuity. Budish’s analysis was originally framed in terms of proof-of-work protocols but applies more generally to protocols that use arbitrary external or on-chain resources, including proof-of-stake protocols. For example, consider a protocol that uses a single type of resource (e.g., ASICs in Bitcoin or coins in Ethereum), and let c denote the (per-time-unit, or “flow”) cost per timeslot to supply one unit of resources. For simplicity, assume that all protocol participants face the same cost. For a proof-of-work protocol, c is the cost per timeslot to run one ASIC, including variable costs such as electricity and an ongoing cost of capital applied to the hardware. So, in this case, we can define c by $c = rC + \eta$, where C is the (one-time, or “stock”) cost of one unit of hardware, rC is the capital cost of one unit of hardware per timeslot (with r the per-timeslot interest rate), and η is the variable cost of electricity per unit of hardware per timeslot. For a proof-of-stake protocol, c represents the opportunity cost of locking up stake, so c may be specified by $c = rC$, where C is the cost of one unit of stake.

Let d denote the total (expected) reward earned by all validators combined per timeslot (perhaps a combination of block rewards paid out by the protocol, transaction fees paid by users, and other sources). For a blockchain protocol like Bitcoin or Ethereum, the barriers to enter or exit the set of miners or validators are low; thus, we expect the marginal miner or validator to break even (otherwise, there would be an incentive either for new validators to enter or for existing validators to exit). Mathematically, this translates to the zero-profit condition that $c = d/N^*$ or, equivalently $N^*c = d$, where N^* denotes the number of resource units held by protocol participants. Because the reward d is paid out to miners or validators every single timeslot, it is presumably a small fraction of the total value of the protocol’s native currency. Now suppose that causing a consistency violation requires the attacker to hold AN^* units of the resource for some $A > 0$. If an attack takes T timeslots to complete, then the cost incurred by the attacker in holding sufficient capital for the attack is only $AN^*cT = AdT$. If d and T are small and there are no economic consequences to the attacker subsequent to its attack (e.g., due to confiscated stake), the conclusion is that consistency violations and double-spend attacks are relatively cheap, with cost scaling with the recurring per-block costs $d = N^*c$ of securing the blockchain protocol, rather than the total value N^*C of the resources devoted to securing the protocol. The EAAC property introduced in the present paper loosely corresponds to the insistence that the economic cost of causing a consistency violation should scale with C rather than with c .

Consistency vs. liveness violations. One reason we focus on consistency violations (as opposed to liveness violations) is that they are the ones that can be unequivocally attributed to deviations from the intended protocol by an attacker (as opposed to network delays or other vagaries outside the control of honest participants). A second is that, in practice, consistency violations are generally considered much more serious than liveness violations (akin to money permanently disappearing from your bank account vs. the bank’s computer system going down for a few hours).

1.5. Further related work.

1.5.1. Accountability: Positive results.

The closest analogue to our work in the distributed computing literature is a sequence of papers, including Buterin and Griffith [10], Civit, Gilbert, and Gramoli [15], and Shamis et al. [42], about protocols that satisfy *accountability*, meaning protocols that can provide certificates of guilt in the event of a consistency violation. Further examples of papers in this sequence include Sheng et al. [43], who analyze accountability for well-known permissioned protocols such as HotStuff [47], PBFT [12], Tendermint [2, 3], and Algorand [13]; and Civit et al. [17, 16], who describe generic transformations that take any permissioned protocol designed for the partially synchronous setting and provide a corresponding accountable version. All of these papers can be seen as extending earlier work by Kihlstrom, Moser, and Melliard-Smith [29] and Haeberlen, Kouznetsov, and Druschel [26].

None of these papers describe how to carry out asymmetric punishment (e.g., slashing) and thus fall short of our goals here—that is, they address challenge (1) just below Figure 4 but not challenges (2) and (3). One exception to this point is the ZLB protocol of Ranchal-Pedrosa and Gramoli [40], which is a permissioned blockchain protocol (with a fixed and known player set) that is able to implement slashing when the adversary controls less than a $5/9$ fraction of the player set but which does not address the issue of ensuring that slashing is implemented before guilty parties are able to trade out of their position (i.e., challenge (2)). Freitas de Souza et al. [23] also describe a process for removing guilty parties in a protocol for lattice agreement (this abstraction is weaker than consensus and can be implemented in an asynchronous system), but their protocol does not ensure slashing occurs before guilty parties can trade out of their position, and also assumes an honest majority. Sridhar, Zindros, and Tse [44] specify a “gadget” that can be applied to blockchain protocols operating in the synchronous setting to reboot and maintain consistency after an attack, but they do not implement slashing and assume that an honest majority is somehow reestablished out-of-protocol.

Even more significantly, with the exception of [44] and [39, 46, 45] (described below), the entire literature on accountability considers only permissioned protocols. Turning a permissioned protocol into a permissionless one is generally technically challenging (if not impossible) due to the three additional challenges listed in section 1.1. For example, while Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer [22] showed in 1988 how to achieve consistency and liveness in the partially synchronous setting with an adversary that controls less than one-third of the players, the first permissionless analogue of this result was proved only last year [33]. Our positive result here (Theorem 5.1) provides a (permissionless) proof-of-stake protocol that, for an adversary controlling less than two-thirds of the total stake, provably implements slashing: It reaches consensus on slashing conditions, even in the face of consistency violations, before the adversary is able to remove their stake, thereby guaranteeing the EAAC property. As the protocol overview in section 6 makes clear, a number of new ideas are required to obtain this result. Our positive result constitutes a significant advance, even in the permissioned setting (relative to [40]), in that our protocol can punish adversaries that control

less than two-thirds (as opposed to five-ninths) of the overall player participation. As noted in section 1.3, this bound of $2/3$ is the best possible.

Prior to the study of accountability, Li and Mazieres [34] considered how to design BFT protocols that still offer certain guarantees when more than f failures occur. They describe a protocol called BFT2F which has the same liveness and consistency guarantees as PBFT when no more than $f < n/3$ players fail; with more than f but no more than $2f$ failures, BFT2F prohibits malicious players from making up operations that clients have never issued and prevents certain kinds of consistency violations.

1.5.2. Accountability: Negative results.

The literature on accountability has focused primarily on positive results. One exception is Neu, Tas, and Tse [39], who prove that no protocol operating in the dynamically available setting can provide accountability. The authors then provide an approach to addressing this limitation by describing a “gadget” that checkpoints a longest-chain protocol. The “full ledger” is then live in the dynamically available setting, while the checkpointed prefix ledger provides accountability. Another exception is Tas et al. [46, 45], who, in addition to positive results on defending against long-range attacks, prove negative results on accountability for adversaries that control at least two-thirds of the player set. None of these papers provide any economic modeling, which is a key contribution of the present work (see section 3).

1.5.3. The cost of double-spend attacks.

On the economics side, the most closely related work to ours is that of Budish [4, 5], which is reviewed briefly in section 1.4; see the references therein and Halaburda et al. [27] for a broader view of economics research on blockchain protocols. Bonneau [1], Leshno, Pass, and Shi [32], and Gans and Halaburda [24] provide additional arguments that, at least for Bitcoin-like protocols, double-spend attacks may be very cheap to execute if there are no post-attack consequences. Leshno, Pass, and Shi [32] also propose a variant of the Bitcoin protocol that halts whenever a consistency violation is detected (in effect making consistency violations impossible by converting them into liveness violations).

1.5.4. The game theory of slashing.

Deb, Raynor, and Kannan [20] consider the game theory of slashing from an angle that is complementary to ours, in a model in which the adversary need not own resources to carry out an attack, but can instead offer bribes to players. (Bonneau [1] and Leshno, Pass, and Shi [32] similarly consider the possibility of bribery by an attacker.) The authors argue that, without slashing, rational players can be incentivized to accept small bribes to deviate from the protocol, even when such deviations by a large number of players cause a consistency violation and a collapse in the value of their resources. Fundamentally, the reason for this is that the price collapse is non-targeted, while bribe pay-offs depend directly on individual actions. The authors point out that targeted slashing,

assuming it could be somehow implemented, could ensure that a unilateral deviation by a single player would lead to significant punishment by the protocol, in which case bribes would be effective only if they were large.

2. The model.

Impossibility results such as Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 require a precise model of the permissionless consensus protocol design space; we adopt the one defined by Lewis-Pye and Roughgarden [33]. In brief, we have the following:

- There is a set of players (unknown to the protocol). Each player can control an unbounded number of identifiers and at each timeslot could be active or inactive.
- Messages are disseminated (e.g., via a gossip protocol) rather than sent point-to-point. Disseminated messages are eventually received by their recipients, possibly after a delay (analogous to the totality and validity properties of reliable broadcast [11, sects. 3.10–3.11]).
- In the synchronous setting, there is a finite upper bound, known to the protocol, on the worst-possible message delay.⁷ In the partially synchronous setting, there is an initial period of unknown finite duration in which message delays may be arbitrary.
- The behavior of a player is a function of the timeslot, its internal state, and the information it has received to-date from other players and from “oracles” (described below). Formally, a protocol is a specification of (the intended version of) this function.
- Each player maintains a running (ordered) list of transactions that it regards as confirmed.
- Players can own resources, which may be “external” to the protocol (e.g., hashrate) or “on-chain” (e.g., registered stake). External resources evolve independently of the protocol, while the values of on-chain resources generally depend on the transactions that have been confirmed thus far.
- A ρ -bounded adversary is one that never controls more than a ρ fraction of the overall amount of an (external or on-chain) resource that is controlled by the currently active players.
- Protocols may make use of “oracles” that represent cryptographic primitives. External resources are modeled as a special type of oracle (called a “permitter”) to which the allowable queries depend on a player’s resource balance.
- A protocol satisfies consistency if players’ running transaction lists are consistent across players and across time (if $\mathbf{T}$ and $\mathbf{T}'$ are the lists of honest players p and p' at timeslots t and t' , then either $\mathbf{T}$ is a prefix of $\mathbf{T}'$ or vice versa).
- A protocol satisfies liveness if, during periods of synchrony, honest players regularly add new confirmed transactions to their running lists.

Sections 2.1–2.6 provide the mathematical details, and further discussion of the model can be found in [33].

In addition to this design space, we adopt the “hierarchy of permissionlessness” proposed in [33]. Intuitively, and phrased here specifically for proof-of-stake protocols, the two key definitions are the following (see section 2.7 for details):

- In the dynamically available setting, at every timeslot, at least one non-malicious player with a non-zero amount of registered stake is active.

- In the quasi-permissionless setting, at every timeslot, every non-malicious player with a non-zero amount of registered stake is active.

The rest of this section fills in the details of these definitions. The reader interested in attack cost modeling can skip to section 3, referring back to this section as needed (e.g., when reading the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2).

2.1. The set of players and the means of communication.

The set of players. We consider a potentially infinite set of players $\mathcal{P}$. Each player $p \in \mathcal{P}$ is allocated a non-empty and potentially infinite set of *identifiers* $\text{id}(p)$. One can think of $\text{id}(p)$ as an arbitrarily large pre-generated set of public keys for which p knows the corresponding private key; a player p can use its identifiers to create an arbitrarily large number of sybils. Identifier sets are disjoint, meaning $\text{id}(p) \cap \text{id}(p') = \emptyset$ when $p \neq p'$; intuitively, no player knows the private keys that are held by other players.

Permissionless entry and exit. Time is divided into discrete timeslots $t = 1, 2, \dots$, and each player may or may not be *active* at each timeslot. A *player allocation* is a function specifying $\text{id}(p)$ for each $p \in \mathcal{P}$ and the timeslots at which each player is active. Because protocols generally require *some* active players to achieve any non-trivial functionality, we assume that a non-zero but finite number of players is active at each timeslot. The player allocation is exogenous, in that we do not model why a player might be active or inactive at a given timeslot.

Inputs. Each player is given a finite set of *inputs*, which capture its knowledge at the beginning of the execution of a protocol. If a variable is specified as one of p 's inputs, we refer to it as *determined for* p ; otherwise, it is *undetermined for* p . If a variable is determined/undetermined for all p , then we refer to it as *determined/undetermined*. For example, to model a permissionless environment with sybils, we assume that $\text{id}(p)$ and the timeslots at which p is active are determined for p but undetermined for $p' \neq p$.

Message sending. At each timeslot, each active player may *disseminate* a finite set of messages (each of finite length) and will receive a (possibly empty) multiset of messages that have been disseminated by other players at previous timeslots. Players do not disseminate or receive any messages while inactive.⁸ We consider two of the most common models of communication reliability: the synchronous and partially synchronous models. These models have to be adapted, however, to deal with the fact that players may not be active at all timeslots.

Synchronous model. There exists some determined $\Delta \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ such that if p disseminates m at t , and if $p' \neq p$ is active at $t' \geq t + \Delta$, then p' receives that dissemination at a timeslot $\leq t'$.

Partially synchronous model. There exist some determined $\Delta \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ and undetermined timeslot GST such that if p disseminates m at t and $p' \neq p$ is active at $t' \geq \max\{\text{GST}, t\} + \Delta$, then p' receives that dissemination at a timeslot $\leq t'$.

2.2. Players and oracles.

Using an approach that is common in distributed computing, we model player behavior via state machine diagrams. The description of a protocol also specifies a (possibly empty) set of *oracles* $\mathcal{O} = \{O_1, \dots, O_z\}$, which are used to capture idealized cryptographic primitives. Players may send *queries* to the oracles and will then receive *responses* in return. At each timeslot t , the state transition made by player p therefore depends on the oracle responses received by p at t , as well as t , p 's present state, and the messages received by p at t . We refer the reader to [33] for a simple description of how oracles can be used to model standard cryptographic primitives such as signature schemes, verifiable delay functions, and ephemeral keys. Section 2.3 and Appendix A describe precisely how oracles can be used to model *external resources* such as ASICs (for proof-of-work protocols) and memory chips (for proof-of-space protocols).

Byzantine and honest players. To ensure that our impossibility results are as strong as possible, we consider a *static adversary*. In the static adversary model, each player is either *Byzantine* or *honest* and an arbitrary and undetermined subset of the players may be Byzantine. The difference between Byzantine and honest players is that honest players must have the state diagram specified by the protocol, while Byzantine players may have arbitrary state diagrams.⁹ To model a perfectly coordinated adversary, we also allow that the instructions carried out by each Byzantine player can depend on the messages and responses received by other Byzantine players. That is, if p is Byzantine, the messages p disseminates, the queries p sends, and p 's state transition at a timeslot t are a function not only of p 's state and the multiset of messages and oracle responses received by p at t but also of the corresponding values for all the other Byzantine players.

2.3. Modeling external resources.

External vs. on-chain resources. We suppose blockchain validation requires *resources*, which can either be *external* or *on-chain*. External resources are the hardware (such as ASICs or memory chips) required by validators in proof-of-work (PoW) or proof-of-space (PoSp) protocols. By contrast, on-chain resources are those such as stake that are recorded on the blockchain. From the perspective of our analysis here, a key distinction between external and on-chain resources is that the latter can be confiscated by consensus amongst validators.

External resources and permitters. *Permitter oracles*, or simply *permitters*, are required for modeling external resources (but not for on-chain resources). A protocol may use a finite set of permitters. These are listed as part of the protocol amongst the oracles in $\mathcal{O}$ but have some distinguished features.

The resource allocation. For each execution of the protocol, and for each permitter oracle O , we are given a corresponding *resource allocation*, denoted by $\mathbf{R}^O$. We assume that $\mathbf{R}^O$ is undetermined, as befits an “external” resource. The resource allocation can be thought of as assigning each player some amount of the external resource at each timeslot. That is, for all $p \in \mathcal{P}$ and t , we have $\mathbf{R}^O(p, t) \in \mathbb{N}$. We refer to $\mathbf{R}^O(p, t)$ as p ’s *balance* at t . Because balances are unknown to a protocol, an inactive player might as well have a zero balance: $\mathbf{R}^O(p, t) = 0$ whenever p is not active at t . For each t , we also define $\mathbf{R}^O(t) := \sum_p \mathbf{R}^O(p, t)$.

Restricting the adversary. An arbitrary value $\mathbf{R}_{\max}^O$ is given as a protocol input. This value is determined, but the protocol must function for any given value of $\mathbf{R}_{\max}^O \geq 1$.¹⁰ Let B denote the set of Byzantine players, and define $\mathbf{R}_B^O(t) := \sum_{p \in B} \mathbf{R}^O(p, t)$. For $\rho \in [0, 1]$, we say that $\mathbf{R}^O$ is ρ -*bounded* if the following conditions are satisfied for all t :

- $\mathbf{R}^O(t) \in [1, \mathbf{R}_{\max}^O]$.
- $\mathbf{R}_B^O(t) / \mathbf{R}^O(t) \leq \rho$.

The smaller the value of ρ , the more severe the restriction on the combined “power” of the Byzantine players. If all resource allocations corresponding to permitters in $\mathcal{O}$ are ρ -bounded, then we say the adversary is *externally ρ -bounded*.

Permitter oracles. At each timeslot, a player may send *queries* to each permitter oracle. These queries can be thought of as requests for proof-of-work or proof-of-space, and the player will then receive a *response* to each query at the same timeslot. The difference between permitter oracles and other oracles is that the queries that a player p can send to a permitter oracle O at timeslot t depend on $\mathbf{R}^O(p, t)$. If a player p sends a query to the permitter oracle O at timeslot t , the query must be of the form (b, σ) such that $b \in \mathbb{N}$ and $b \leq \mathbf{R}^O(p, t)$. Importantly, this constraint applies also to Byzantine players. In the case of a proof-of-work protocol, the query (b, σ) can be thought of as a request for a proof-of-work for the string σ , to which hashrate b is committed at timeslot t .

Single and multi-use permitters. A player may make multiple queries $(b_1, \sigma_1), \dots, (b_k, \sigma_k)$ to a permitter in a single timeslot t , subject to the following constraints. With a *single-use* permitter—the appropriate version for modeling the Bitcoin protocol (see Appendix A for details)—these queries are restricted from satisfying $\sum_{i=1}^k b_i \leq \mathbf{R}^O(p, t)$. (Interpreting the b_i ’s as hashrates devoted to the queries, this constraint asserts that none of a player’s overall hashrate can be “reused.”) With a *multi-use* permitter—the more convenient version for modeling protocols that incorporate proof-of-space such as Chia [18]—the only restriction is that $b_i \leq \mathbf{R}^O(p, t)$ for each $i = 1, 2, \dots, k$. (Intuitively, space devoted to storing lookup tables can be reused across different “challenges.”)

Permitter responses. If O is deterministic, then when p sends the query (b, σ) to O at timeslot t , the values t, b , and σ determine the response r of the permitter. To prevent responses from being forged

by Byzantine players, r is a message signed by the permitter. If O is probabilistic, then t, b , and σ determine a distribution on responses.

2.4. Modeling stake.

For the sake of simplicity, we restrict our attention here to on-chain resources that are forms of stake. We refer the reader to [33] for further discussion of other forms of on-chain resources and note that the results we present here are easily adapted to accommodate general on-chain resources.

The approach to modeling stake. This section defines *stake allocation functions*, which take *transactions* as inputs. Section 2.5 describes how *blockchain protocols* are required to select specific sequences of transactions to which stake allocation functions can be applied so as to specify the stake of each player at a given point in a protocol execution.

The environment. For each execution of a blockchain protocol, there exists an undetermined *environment*, denoted by $\mathbf{En}$, which sends *transactions* to players. Transactions are messages signed by the environment. If $\mathbf{En}$ sends $\mathbf{tr}$ to p at timeslot t , then p receives $\mathbf{tr}$ at t as a member of its multiset of messages received at that timeslot. Formally, the environment $\mathbf{En}$ is simply a set of triples of the form $(p, \mathbf{tr}, t)$ such that p is active at t . We stipulate that if $(p, \mathbf{tr}, t) \in \mathbf{En}$, then p receives the transaction $\mathbf{tr}$ at t , in addition to the other disseminations that it receives at t . We assume that, for each $p \in \mathcal{P}$ and each t , there exist at most finitely many triples $(p, \mathbf{tr}, t)$ in $\mathbf{En}$.

We allow a protocol to specify a finite set of *stake allocation functions*, representing one or more forms of stake (e.g., stake amounts held in escrow in a designated staking contract).

The initial stake distribution corresponding to a stake allocation function. Corresponding to each stake allocation function $\mathbf{S}$ is an *initial distribution*, denoted by $\mathbf{S}^*$, which is given to every player as an input. This distribution allocates a positive integer amount of stake to each of a finite and non-zero number of identifiers, and can be thought of as chosen by an adversary, subject to any constraints imposed on the fraction of stake controlled by Byzantine players.

Stake allocation functions. If $\mathbf{T}$ is a sequence of transactions, then $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) \in \mathbb{N}$ is the stake owned by identifier id after execution of the transactions in $\mathbf{T}$. It will also be notationally convenient to let $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T})$ denote the function which on input id gives output $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id)$. If $\mathbf{T}$ is a sequence of transactions, then $\mathbf{T} * \mathbf{tr}$ denotes the sequence $\mathbf{T}$ concatenated with $\mathbf{tr}$.

We conclude this section with some baseline assumptions about how stake works.¹¹ We assume that players' initial allocations can be transferred. Formally, given stake allocation functions $\{\mathbf{S}_1, \dots, \mathbf{S}_j\}$, we assume the following: for all initial distributions $\mathbf{S}_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{S}_j^*$ and every finite subset I of identifiers, there exists a set of transactions such that, no matter how they are ordered into a sequence $\mathbf{T}$, $\mathbf{S}_h(\mathbf{S}_h^*, \mathbf{T}, id) = 0$ for every $h \in [j]$ and $id \in I$.¹² We also assume that some

transactions $\mathbf{tr}$ are *benign* in the sense that they do not destroy this property: for every $\mathbf{S}_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{S}_j^*$ and I , there exists a set of transactions such that, no matter how they are ordered into a sequence $\mathbf{T}$, $\mathbf{S}_h(\mathbf{S}_h^*, \mathbf{tr} * \mathbf{T}, id) = 0$ for every $h \in [j]$ and $id \in I$.¹³ We do not assume that all transactions are benign in this sense; for example, the PosT protocol in section 9 uses (non-benign) transactions that are “certificates of guilt” which have the effect of freezing the assets of the implicated identifiers.

2.5. Consistency and liveness.

Confirmed transactions. Each *blockchain protocol* specifies a *confirmation rule* $\mathcal{C}$, which is a function that takes as input an arbitrary set of messages M and returns a sequence $\mathbf{T}$ of the transactions among those messages. At timeslot t , if M is the set of all messages received by an honest player p at timeslots $\leq t$, then p regards the transactions in $\mathcal{C}(M)$ as *confirmed*. For a set of messages M , define $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, M, id) := \mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathcal{C}(M), id)$ and $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, M) := \mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathcal{C}(M))$.

We will be interested in blockchain protocols that are *live* and *consistent*. For the sake of simplicity (to avoid the discussion of small error probabilities), in this paper we consider versions of liveness and consistency that apply to deterministic protocols. The proofs of our negative results (Theorems 4.1 and 4.2) will apply directly to deterministic protocols, but are easily extended to give analogous impossibility results for probabilistic protocols, simply by accounting for the appropriate error probabilities.¹⁴ The proof of our positive result (Theorem 5.1) uses a deterministic protocol, which only strengthens the result.

Defining liveness. We say a protocol is *live* if there exists a constant T_l , which may depend on the message delay bound Δ and the other determined protocol inputs, such that, whenever the environment sends a transaction $\mathbf{tr}$ to an honest player at some timeslot t , $\mathbf{tr}$ is among the sequence of confirmed transactions for every active honest player at every timeslot $t' \geq \max\{t, \text{GST}\} + T_l$. (In the synchronous model, GST should be interpreted as 0.)¹⁵

Defining consistency. Suppose the sequence of confirmed transactions for p at t is $\sigma = (\mathbf{tr}_1, \dots, \mathbf{tr}_k)$ and that the sequence of confirmed transactions for p' at $t' \geq t$ is $\sigma' = (\mathbf{tr}'_1, \dots, \mathbf{tr}'_{k'})$. We say a blockchain protocol is *consistent* if it holds that in all executions whenever p and p' are honest, the following hold:

- If $p = p'$ then σ' *extends* σ , meaning that $k' \geq k$ and $\mathbf{tr}_i = \mathbf{tr}'_i$ for each $i \in [1, k]$.
- Either σ extends σ' , or σ' extends σ .

2.6. Protocols, executions, and ρ -bounded adversaries.

Specifying blockchain protocols and executions. A blockchain protocol is a tuple $(\Sigma, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S})$, where Σ is the state machine diagram determining honest players, $\mathcal{O}$ is a set of oracles (some of which may

be permitters), $\mathcal{C}$ is a confirmation rule, and $\mathcal{S} = \{\mathbf{S}_1, \dots, \mathbf{S}_j\}$ is a set of stake allocation functions. In a *proof-of-stake (PoS)* protocol, $\mathcal{S} \neq \emptyset$.

An *execution* of the protocol $(\Sigma, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S})$ is a specification of the set of players $\mathcal{P}$, the player allocation, the state diagram of each player and their inputs, and the following values for each player p at each timeslot: (i) p 's state at the beginning of the timeslot; (ii) the multiset of messages received by p ; (iii) the oracle queries sent by p ; (iv) the oracle responses received by p ; (v) the messages disseminated by p .

Defining ρ -bounded adversaries. We say that an execution of a protocol is ρ -bounded if the following hold:

- The adversary is externally ρ -bounded (in the sense of section 2.3).
- For each stake allocation function $\mathbf{S} \in \mathcal{S}$, and among active players, Byzantine players never control more than a ρ fraction of the stake. Formally, for every honest player p at timeslot t , if $\mathbf{T}$ is the set of transactions that are confirmed for p at t in this execution, then at most a ρ fraction of the stake allocated to players active at t by $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T})$ is allocated to Byzantine players.

When we say that “the adversary is ρ -bounded,” we mean that we restrict our attention to ρ -bounded executions. We say that a protocol is ρ -resilient when it is live and consistent under the assumption that the adversary is ρ -bounded. We say that a protocol is ρ -resilient for liveness when it lives under the assumption that the adversary is ρ -bounded and that it is ρ -resilient for consistency when it is consistent under the assumption that the adversary is ρ -bounded.

2.7. The dynamically available and quasi-permissionless settings.

Lewis-Pye and Roughgarden [33] describe a “degree of permissionlessness” hierarchy that parameterizes what a protocol may assume about the activity of honest players. This hierarchy is defined by four settings. Informally, they are the following:

1. *Fully permissionless setting.* At each moment in time, the protocol has no knowledge about which players are currently running it. Proof-of-work protocols are typically interpreted as operating in this setting.
2. *Dynamically available setting.* At each moment in time, the protocol is aware of a dynamically evolving list of identifiers, in the sense that protocol participation is governed by on-chain (rather than external) resource balances (e.g., public keys that currently have stake committed in a designated staking contract). The protocol may assume that at least *some* honest members of this list are active and participating in the protocol but must satisfy consistency and liveness even when levels of participation fluctuate unpredictably.¹⁶ Proof-of-stake longest-chain protocols are typically designed to function correctly in this setting.
3. *Quasi-permissionless setting.* At each moment in time, the protocol is aware of a dynamically evolving list of identifiers (as in the dynamically available setting), but now the protocol may

assume that *all* honest members of the list are active. Proof-of-stake PBFT-style protocols are typically interpreted as operating in this setting.

4. *Permissioned setting.* The list of identifiers is fixed at the time of the protocol's deployment, with one identifier per participant and with no dependence on the protocol's execution. At each moment in time, membership in this list is necessary and sufficient for current participation in the protocol. PBFT is a canonical example of a blockchain protocol that is designed for the permissioned setting.

Each level of the hierarchy is a strictly easier setting (for possibility results) than the previous level. For example, an impossibility result for the dynamically available setting such as Theorem 4.1 automatically holds also in the fully permissionless setting.

Formally defining the dynamically available setting. In the dynamically available setting, no assumptions are made about participation by honest players, other than the minimal assumption that, at each timeslot, if any honest player owns a non-zero amount of stake, then at least one such player is active.¹⁷

Consider the protocol $(\Sigma, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S})$. By definition, an execution of the protocol is *consistent with the dynamically available setting* if, for each stake allocation function $\mathbf{S} \in \mathcal{S}$, the following holds:

Whenever p is honest and active at t , with $\mathbf{T}$ the set of transactions confirmed for p at t in this execution, if there exists an honest player assigned a non-zero amount of stake by $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T})$, then at least one such player is active at t .

Formally defining the quasi-permissionless setting. Consider the protocol $(\Sigma, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S})$. By definition, an execution of the protocol is *consistent with the quasi-permissionless setting* if, for each stake allocation function $\mathbf{S} \in \mathcal{S}$, the following holds:

Whenever p is honest and active at t , with $\mathbf{T}$ the set of transactions confirmed for p at t in this execution, every honest player that is assigned a non-zero amount of stake by $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T})$ is active at t .

Thus, the quasi-permissionless setting insists on activity from every honest player that possesses any amount of any form of stake listed in the protocol description.

3. The cost of an attack.

3.1. An overly simplified attempt.

Consider an attacker poised to execute an attack, in the form of a consistency violation, on a permissionless consensus protocol. When would carrying out such an attack have negative economic consequences for the attacker, meaning that, ignoring off-chain gains (from double-spends, short positions, etc.), it's "worse off" than before? (ideally, with honest players "no worse off" than before.) A first cut might be to track the market value of all the protocol-relevant resources owned by each (honest or Byzantine) player. That is, consider a blockchain protocol that uses k resources, and let

$\mathbf{R}_i(p, t)$ denote the number of units of the i th resource (e.g., ASICs or coins) owned by player p at timeslot t . Let $C_i(t)$ denote the per-unit market price of the i th resource at timeslot t and define p 's “net worth” at timeslot t by

$$V(p, t) := \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbf{R}_i(p, t) \cdot C_i(t).$$

The “consequences of an attack” carried out by a set B of Byzantine players at some timeslot t^* could then be measured by the value of B 's resources immediately before and after the attack:

$$\frac{\sum_{p \in B} V(p, t_+^*)}{\sum_{p \in B} V(p, t_-^*)},$$

with lower values of this ratio corresponding to more severe economic consequences of an attack. The idea that “the honest players H should be no worse off” would then translate to the condition that

$$V(p, t_+^*) \geq V(p, t_-^*)$$

for every $p \in H$.

We can then consider how the different scenarios laid out in section 1.2 would translate to this formalism.

Scenario 1: Status quo. Suppose the Bitcoin protocol suffers a consistency violation and yet neither of the narratives in section 1.2 plays out as expected, with both the cryptocurrency price and the cryptographic hash function used for proof-of-work mining unchanged following the attack. Then the new market price $C(t_+^*)$ of an ASIC would equal the old price $C(t_-^*)$, and hence $V(p, t_+^*)$ would equal $V(p, t_-^*)$ for every player p . (In this example, there's only one resource—hashrate—and so we drop the dependence on i .) Thus, while the condition (3) would hold (which is good), the ratio in (2) would be 1, indicating an attack without any economic consequences. We will call such an attack *cheap*.

Scenario 2: Price collapse (proof-of-work). Nakamoto's original narrative posited that a double-spend attack on the Bitcoin protocol would significantly decrease the USD value of BTC (and hence of ASICs for Bitcoin mining), an assumption that translates to $C(t_+^*) \ll C(t_-^*)$ and hence, for any (honest or Byzantine) ASIC-owning miner p , $V(p, t_+^*) \ll V(p, t_-^*)$. In this case, the attack is *expensive*, meaning that the ratio in (2) is less than one. It is expensive for the wrong reasons, however, in the sense that the condition in (3) fails. We therefore say that the attack is *expensive due to collapse*.

Scenario 3: A hard fork (proof-of-work). The second narrative in section 1.2, in which a double-spend attack on a proof-of-work protocol is punished through a hard fork that changes the cryptographic hash function used for proof-of-work mining, is mathematically equivalent to the first, with existing ASICs losing much of their value, and so $C(t_+^*) \ll C(t_-^*)$.¹⁸ This again is an example of an attack that is expensive, but expensive due to collapse.

Scenario 4: Price collapse (proof-of-stake). Consider now a proof-of-stake protocol—be it longest-chain, PBFT-type with slashing, or anything else—in which case $C(t)$ denotes the USD-denominated market price at time t of one coin of the protocol's native cryptocurrency. If a double-spend attack harms this cryptocurrency's price, then, as in Scenario 2, the attack is expensive due to collapse.

Scenario 5: Successful slashing. Can any protocol—a proof-of-stake protocol, say—make attacks expensive for the right reasons, not due to collapse? To make this question precise, let's assume that a double-spend attack has no effect on the price of the protocol's native currency, i.e., $C(t_+^*) = C(t_-^*)$. Suppose further that a protocol is able to fulfill the promises of slashing outlined in section 1.2, identifying (at least some of) the Byzantine players and surgically confiscating their stake (without inadvertently destroying any stake owned by honest players). Then $R(p, t_+^*)$ would be less than $R(p, t_-^*)$ (and hence $V(p, t_+^*)$ would be less than $V(p, t_-^*)$) for at least some $p \in B$, while $V(p, t_+^*) = V(p, t_-^*)$ for all $p \in H$. As a result, the ratio in (2) would be less than 1, even as the condition in (3) holds. In this case, we call the attack *expensive even in the absence of collapse*. A protocol would then be called EAAC if every possible consistency violation would be expensive in this sense.

3.2. The formal definitions.

Delayed economic consequences. The definitions proposed in section 3.1 convey the spirit of our approach, but they are inadequate for a number of reasons. For example, there is no hope of designing a protocol that is EAAC in the sense above: the expression in (2) considers only the immediate economic cost suffered by an attack, while any protocol-inflicted punishment would require some time to take effect. For example, to enact slashing in a proof-of-stake protocol, honest players need time to communicate, confirm evidence of a consistency violation, and carry out the appropriate slashing instructions. (Changes in the price of the protocol's native currency, should they occur, would presumably also play out over a period of time.) Thus, we must instead insist that Byzantine players suffer economic consequences from a consistency violation at some timeslot t_f

after the timeslot t^* in which the consistency violation is seen by honest players (here the “ f ” stands for “final”). Intuitively, t_f is a timeslot by which the aftermath of the attack has played out, with the currency price restabilized (possibly at a new level) and any protocol-inflicted punishment complete.

Investment functions. Next, the definition of the functions $\mathbf{R}_i(p, t)$, henceforth called *investment functions*, requires more care. For an external resource i , $\mathbf{R}_i(p, t)$ denotes the (objective) number of units of that resource owned by p at t , as before. For a resource i that corresponds to some form of stake or other on-chain resource, $\mathbf{R}_i(p, t)$ may depend on the sets of messages that have been received by each player at or before timeslot t . (We generally abuse notation and continue to write $\mathbf{R}_i(p, t)$, suppressing the dependence on the sets of received messages and the protocol that generates them.) We allow flexibility in exactly how investment functions are defined, but the rough idea is that $\mathbf{R}_i(p, t)$ should update once a resource-changing transaction has been “sufficiently processed” by the protocol (e.g., confirmed by an appropriate honest player). Our three main results concern investment functions of the following types:

- Our negative result for the dynamically available setting (Theorem 4.1) holds for any choice of investment functions and thus requires no further modeling.
- Our negative result for the partially synchronous setting (Theorem 4.2) holds, assuming only that, provided no consistency violation has been seen, zeroing out one’s stake balance eventually zeroes out the corresponding investment function (i.e., the user eventually recoups their investment).

Formally, consider an investment function $\mathbf{R}_i$ that corresponds to a stake allocation function $\mathbf{S}$. Suppose that, in any execution $\mathbf{E}$ in which

- t is a timeslot $\geq \text{GST}$;
- no honest player has seen a consistency violation by timeslot $t + \Gamma$;
- for some player p and honest player p' , $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}_{t'}, id) = 0$ for all $id \in \text{id}(p)$ and $t' \in [t, t + \Gamma]$, where $\mathbf{T}_{t'}$ denotes the transactions confirmed for p' at timeslot t' ;

it holds that $\mathbf{R}_i(p, t + \Gamma) = 0$ and, moreover, that $\mathbf{R}_i(p, t + \Gamma) = 0$ also in every execution that is indistinguishable from $\mathbf{E}$ for p' up to timeslot $t + \Gamma$ (i.e., every execution in which p' receives the same inputs, messages, and oracle responses at each timeslot $< t + \Gamma$ as in $\mathbf{E}$). In this case, we call $\mathbf{R}_i$ a Γ -liquid investment function. A liquid investment function is one that is Γ -liquid for some finite Γ . (Intuitively, barring a consistency violation seen by honest players, p can eventually recoup its investment from p' , or more generally from any third party that relies on p' to assess which transactions have been confirmed.)

- For our positive result in Theorem 5.1, we use what we call a *canonical PoS* investment function. Here there is a single resource, representing the amount of stake that a player has locked up in escrow. The resource balance of a player changes only through staking and unstaking transactions. A canonical investment function $R(p, t)$ increases by x after a valid staking

transaction (with staking amount x) is first confirmed by some honest player (possibly after a delay) and decreases by x after a valid unstaking transaction is first confirmed by some honest player (again, possibly after a delay). Such a function is Γ -liquid, where Γ is the maximum delay before the investment function reflects a newly confirmed staking or unstaking transaction.

In all these cases, we can interpret the economic investment of a player p at some timeslot t by the expression in (1), as before.¹⁹

Valuation functions. Finally, we must specify the allowable behavior of a value function that represents the economic value of on-chain resources following a consistency violation. In general, we allow a quite abstract notion of a *valuation function* v that is a nonnegative function of a set P of players, a timeslot t , player investments at that time (the $\mathbf{R}_i(p, t)$'s), market prices at that time (the $C_i(t)$'s), and the sets of messages that have been received by each player by that time. Our impossibility results (Theorems 4.1 and 4.2) apply to all such valuations and thus require no further modeling.

For our positive result (Theorem 5.1), we use what we call a *canonical PoS* valuation function, which satisfies two further requirements. First, we require it to be *consistency-respecting*, in the sense that it is defined only for timeslots t at which consistency holds (i.e., if $\mathbf{T}$ and $\mathbf{T}'$ are the confirmed transactions for honest p and p' at t , then one of $\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{T}'$ is a prefix of the other).²⁰ Second, at timeslots at which consistency does hold, the valuation function equals the value of the as-yet-unslashed stake-in-escrow of the players in question (at the current market prices).²¹

EAAC protocols. We now proceed to our formal definition of an “EAAC” protocol. As noted in the last scenario of section 3.1, to have any hope of avoiding collateral damage to honest participants, we must assume that a consistency violation does not affect the market prices of the relevant resources. Thus, in the following definition, we consider a fixed price C_i for each resource rather than an arbitrary price sequence $\{C_i(t)\}_{t \geq 1}$.

DEFINITION 3.1.

A protocol is EAAC with respect to investment functions $\{\mathbf{R}_i(\cdot, \cdot)\}_{i \in [k]}$ and valuation function v in a given setting if, for every choice $\{C_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ of fixed resource prices, every external resource i , and every choice $\{\mathbf{R}_i(p, t)\}_{p \in P, t \geq 1}$ of players' investments in i the following hold:

- a. for every execution of the protocol consistent with the setting and every timeslot $t \geq 1$,

$$v(H, t, \{\mathbf{R}_i(p, t)\}_{p \in H, i \in [k]}, \{C_i\}_{i \in [k]}, \mathcal{M}) \geq \sum_{p \in H} \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbf{R}_i(p, t) \cdot C_i,$$

where H denotes the set of honest players and $\mathcal{M}$ the sets of messages received by each player by timeslot t in the execution; and

- b. for every execution of the protocol consistent with the setting with a consistency violation that is first seen by honest players at a timeslot t^* , there exists a timeslot $t_f \geq t^*$ such that

$$(5) \quad v(B, t_f, \{\mathbf{R}_i(p, t_f)\}_{p \in B, i \in [k]}, \{C_i\}_{i \in [k]}, \mathcal{M}) < \sum_{p \in B} \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbf{R}_i(p, t_f) \cdot C_i,$$

where B denotes the set of Byzantine players and $\mathcal{M}$ the sets of messages received by each player by timeslot t in the execution.²²

Intuitively, part (a) of Definition 3.1 requires that honest players can always recoup whatever they may have invested (e.g., they are never slashed in a proof-of-stake protocol). Part (b) asserts that an attacker will be unable to fully cash out, with some of their investment lost to the protocol.

For brevity, we sometimes denote by α_H the ratio between the left- and right-hand sides of (4) and by α_B the analogous ratio for (5). (If the right-hand side is 0 or the left-hand side is undefined, we can interpret the ratio as 1.) Thus, the EAAC condition states that $\alpha_H \geq 1$ should always hold (i.e., if attacks are expensive, it's for the right reasons, not due to collapse) and that $\alpha_B < 1$ should hold at some point after a consistency violation (i.e., attacks are indeed expensive). If Definition 3.1 holds with condition (b) always satisfied with some $\alpha_B \leq \alpha < 1$, then we say that the protocol is α -EAAC (with respect to $\{\mathbf{R}_i(\cdot, \cdot)\}_{i \in [k]}$ and v).²³

4. Impossibility results.

Our first result establishes that blockchain protocols that are live and consistent in the dynamically available setting are always cheaply attackable in the absence of collapse. In other words, once an adversary is large enough to cause consistency violations, they are also large enough to avoid asymmetric punishment. The proof of Theorem 4.1 appears in section 7.

THEOREM 4.1 (impossibility result for the dynamically available setting).

In the dynamically available setting, with a $\frac{1}{2}$ -bounded adversary, for every choice of investment functions and valuation function, no protocol can be live and EAAC. This holds even in the synchronous model and with Byzantine players that have fixed (i.e., time-invariant) resource balances.

Recall the hierarchy of settings described in section 2.7. Theorem 4.1 establishes that if we want to work with protocols that are non-trivially EAAC in some level of this hierarchy, then we cannot work in the fully permissionless or dynamically available settings and must instead focus on the quasi-permissionless or permissioned settings.

The next theorem shows that, even should we work in the quasi-permissionless setting, protocols cannot be non-trivially EAAC if we work in the partial synchrony model. The proof of Theorem 4.2 appears in section 8.

THEOREM 4.2 (impossibility result for the partially synchronous setting).

In the quasi-permissionless setting and the partial synchrony model, with a $(1 - 2\rho_l)$ -bounded adversary, for every choice of liquid investment functions and valuation function, no protocol can be ρ_l -resilient for liveness and EAAC.

For example, suppose we restrict our attention to the standard case of protocols which have the same resilience for liveness and consistency. The seminal result of Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer [22] establishes that protocols for the partial synchrony model can be ρ -resilient only for $\rho < 1/3$. Theorem 4.2 establishes that if the adversary can own at least $1/3$ of the resources, then the protocol cannot be EAAC. In fact, the proof establishes a stronger result: a $\frac{1}{3}$ -bounded adversary can cause consistency violations without any punishment, asymmetric or otherwise (i.e., can carry out attacks that are cheap, even when there is a collapse in the value of resources after the consistency violation is seen).

5. Provable slashing guarantees: A possibility result.

Theorem 4.2 might seem to end the quest for PoS protocols with “slashing” in the partial synchrony model. To circumvent this difficulty, we can consider protocols that are live and consistent in partial synchrony (for some small Δ), so long as the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1/3$, and which, furthermore, implement slashing when the adversary owns more than $1/3$ of the resources but message delivery prior to GST always occurs within some large known time bound Δ^* (which may not be $O(\Delta)$). We argue that this is a realistic setting: while blockchain protocols are commonly expected to be live and consistent in the partial synchrony model with a liveness parameter T_l

determined by some small value of Δ (of the order of 1 s, say), it may also be reasonable to assume that messages will always eventually be delivered, either via the communication network or some “out-of-band” mechanism, within some sufficiently large time bound (of the order of a day or a week, say).²⁴ Theorem 4.2 does not rule out non-trivial EAAC protocols in this setting, provided that the time required for an attacker to recoup its investment following an attack scales with the worst-case delay Δ^* ; see also the discussion at the end of section 8.

Formally, we say a blockchain protocol is (ρ, ρ^*) -EAAC with respect to investment functions $\{\mathbf{R}_i(\cdot, \cdot)\}_{i \in [k]}$ and valuation function v if it satisfies the following two conditions, given any determined values of Δ and $\Delta^* \geq \Delta$ and where ρ^* is determined:

- i. The protocol is live and consistent for the partial synchrony model with respect to Δ , so long as the adversary is ρ -bounded. Here we allow (as in section 2.5) the liveness parameter T_l to depend on Δ and other determined inputs but require it to be independent of Δ^* . *In particular, Δ^* may be much larger than T_l .*
- ii. The protocol is EAAC (with respect to $\{\mathbf{R}_i(\cdot, \cdot)\}_{i \in [k]}$ and v), so long as the adversary is ρ^* -bounded and message delays prior to GST are always at most Δ^* (i.e., if p disseminates m at t , and if $p' \neq p$ is active at $t' \geq t + \Delta^*$, then p' receives that dissemination at a timeslot $\leq t'$).²⁵

If in (ii) the protocol is α -EAAC in the sense of section 3.2, then we say that the protocol is (α, ρ, ρ^*) -EAAC (with respect to $\{\mathbf{R}_i(\cdot, \cdot)\}_{i \in [k]}$ and v).

Our main positive result is the following: we provide the proof in section 9. Canonical PoS investment and valuation functions are defined informally in section 3.2 and formally in section 9.

THEOREM 5.1 (non-trivial EAAC protocols in the quasi-permissionless setting).

For every $\rho < 1/3$ and $\rho^ < 2/3$, there exists a PoS protocol for the quasi-permissionless setting that is (α, ρ, ρ^*) -EAAC with respect to a canonical PoS investment function and a canonical PoS valuation, where*

$$\alpha = \max \left\{ 0, \left(\rho^* - \frac{1}{3} \right) / \rho^* \right\}.$$

This result is optimal in several senses. First, an easy adaptation of the classic proof of Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer [22] shows that protocols cannot be (ρ, ρ^*) -EAAC for $\rho \geq 1/3$. Second, the bound of $2/3$ on ρ^* is tight: the proof of Theorem 1 of Tas et al. [45] (see Appendix C of that paper)

shows that, even in the synchronous setting, a protocol that is ρ_l -resilient for liveness cannot be EAAC with a $(1 - \rho_l)$ -bounded adversary. The $2/3$ bound in the statement of the theorem can therefore only be improved by weakening liveness requirements (as already mentioned in section 1.3, we will describe how our protocol can be so modified in section 9). Third, the bound on α cannot be improved: an adversary with a ρ^* fraction of the overall resources can cause a consistency violation using only one-third of the overall resources in a dishonest way [22]; because honest players cannot be punished, the adversary can guarantee that it retains a $(\rho^* - \frac{1}{3})$ fraction of the overall original resources following its attack.

6. Overview of the PosT protocol and the proof of Theorem 5.1.

We describe a PoS version of Tendermint, which we refer to as PosT. A quick review of permissioned Tendermint is given in section 9. To specify PosT, we envisage that players can add and remove stake from a special staking contract, allowing them to act as “validators.” While added to the staking contract, stake is regarded as being “in escrow” and cannot be transferred between players. Removal of stake from escrow is subject to a delay (of time more than Δ^*). The stake allocation function $\mathbf{S}$ indicates the stake that an identifier has in escrow and which has not been marked for removal from escrow. This is the balance that describes an identifier’s *weight* as a validator: we’ll refer to an identifier’s $\mathbf{S}$ -balance as their *validating stake* (so a player who has non-zero validating stake according to the transactions confirmed for any honest player is a validator).²⁶ Under the assumptions of the quasi-permissionless setting (see section 2.7), all honest players that possess a non-zero amount of validating stake at some timeslot are active at that timeslot.

The use of epochs. Recall that the instructions for Tendermint are divided into *views*. In each view, a designated *leader* proposes the next block of transactions, and other validators may vote on the proposal to form (one or two) *quorum certificates* (QCs) for the block. The instructions for PosT are divided into *epochs*, where each epoch is a sequence of consecutive views. Removal of stake from escrow is achieved via confirmation of an appropriate transaction. If this transaction is confirmed by the start of epoch e , then the corresponding stake remains in escrow until the end of the epoch but no longer contributes to the weight of the corresponding identifier as a validator (their $\mathbf{S}$ -balance). It is only at the end of each epoch that the $\mathbf{S}$ -balance of an identifier can change, meaning that the set of validators is fixed during each epoch.

Certificates of guilt. Recall that $\rho^* < 2/3$ is determined and that our protocol is required to be EAAC only so long as the adversary is ρ^* -bounded. We use standard methods (e.g., see [43]) to ensure that any consistency violation causes the production of a *certificate of guilt*, which is a set of signed messages proving Byzantine action on the part of some of the validating stake during a certain epoch. If a consistency violation occurs in some least epoch e , then the fact that $\rho^* < 2/3$ becomes crucial. This means that honest stake must participate in the confirmation of each block while in epoch e . If message delay prior to GST is always at most Δ^* , then honest validators will end epoch e

within time Δ^* of each other and, by modifying Tendermint to utilize three stages of voting rather than two,²⁷ we will be able to argue that a certificate of guilt must be received by all active honest players within time $2\Delta^*$ of any honest player entering epoch $e + 1$. Defining epochs to be of sufficient length therefore ensures that any consistency violation in epoch e will produce a certificate of guilt which is seen by all active honest players before the end of epoch $e + 1$ and before the stake used to create the consistency violation is removed from escrow.

The recovery procedure. The remaining challenge is to design a recovery procedure for honest players to use, after receiving a certificate of guilt, to reach consensus on a new state in which slashing has been carried out. In more detail, suppose a consistency violation occurs in some least epoch e , with all active honest players receiving a certificate of guilt before the end of epoch $e + 1$. The goal of the recovery procedure is for all honest validators (for epoch e) to output some common block b —an updated genesis block, in effect—which *includes all transactions confirmed by the end of epoch $e - 1$* and which “slashes” (renders unspendable) at least $1/3$ of the validating stake for epoch e (with certificates of guilt provided for all slashed stake).

One potential difficulty in implementing such a recovery procedure is that a consistency violation is only guaranteed to produce a certificate of guilt for $1/3$ of the validating stake. If the adversary possesses $\geq 5/9$ of the validating stake, then they may possess at least a fraction $(5/9 - 1/3)/(2/3) = 1/3$ of the validating stake that remains after slashing. If one were to naively employ some Tendermint-like protocol to reach consensus on an updated genesis block (including slashing conditions) for the next iteration of the protocol, such an adversary could threaten liveness. We address this issue using ideas from the classic protocol of Dolev and Strong [21].²⁸

The full details of the PoST protocol and the proof of Theorem 5.1 are provided in section 9.

7. Impossibility result for the dynamically available setting: The proof of Theorem 4.1.

It suffices to prove the result for the synchronous model. (The following proof will be valid even if $\Delta = 1$.) Suppose the protocol $(\Sigma, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S})$ is live (with liveness parameter T_l) and consistent in the dynamically available setting.

The intuition. Consider two disjoint sets of players X and Y that each own an equal amount of resources. Consider first an execution of the protocol in which players in X are Byzantine, while players in Y are honest. Players in X do not initially communicate with players in Y but rather *simulate* between them an execution in which they are the only ones active. Because the protocol is live in the dynamically available setting, this simulated execution must produce a non-empty sequence $\mathbf{T}$ of confirmed transactions (even without contribution from the players in Y): Note that this conclusion would not hold if operating in the quasi-permissionless or permissioned settings,

because the protocol might then require active participation from players owning a majority of resources to confirm transactions. Meanwhile, and for the same reason, the honest players in Y must eventually confirm a sequence of transaction $\mathbf{T}'$ that may be incompatible with $\mathbf{T}$.

Now suppose that, at some later point, players in X disseminate all the messages that they would have disseminated if honest in their simulated execution. At this point, it is not possible for late arriving players to determine whether the players in X or the players in Y are honest. If $\alpha_B < x$, then $\alpha_H < x$ in a symmetrical execution, in which it is the players in X who are honest, while the players in Y are Byzantine and run their own simulated execution. (The notation α_H and α_B is defined in the discussion following Definition 3.1.)

The formal proof. We consider two non-empty sets of players, X and Y of equal size, and four protocol executions in which all parameters remain the same, unless explicitly stated otherwise. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose all active players in $X \cup Y$ always hold a single unit of each external resource (if any), and all players in $X \cup Y$ begin with one unit of each form of stake (if any). Recall from section 2.6 that $\mathcal{S} = \{\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_j\}$ is a set of stake allocation functions. If $\mathcal{S}$ is non-empty, then we suppose that, for each $\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S}$, the transactions $\mathbf{tr}_1$ and $\mathbf{tr}_2$ mentioned below do not affect the stake controlled by players in $X \cup Y$ (e.g., they are simple transfers between players outside of $X \cup Y$). If $\mathcal{S}$ is empty, then the form of these transactions is of no significance.

Execution 1. The only active players are those in X , who are active at all timeslots. The environment sends a single transaction $\mathbf{tr}_1$ to one of the players, p_1 say, at timeslot 1, and does not send any further transactions. All players are honest. By liveness, $\mathbf{tr}_1$ is confirmed for all active players by timeslot $1 + T_l$.

Execution 2. The only active players are those in Y , who are active at all timeslots. The environment sends a single transaction $\mathbf{tr}_2$ (with $\mathbf{tr}_2 \neq \mathbf{tr}_1$) to one of the players, p_2 say, at timeslot 1, and does not send any further transactions. All players are honest. By liveness, $\mathbf{tr}_2$ is confirmed for all active players by timeslot $1 + T_l$.

Execution 3. The active players are $X \cup Y$, and those players are active at all timeslots. Choose $t^* > 1 + T_l$. The environment sends $\mathbf{tr}_1$ to p_1 and $\mathbf{tr}_2$ to p_2 at timeslot 1 and does not send any further transactions. Players in X are Byzantine, ignore messages from players in Y until t^* , and simulate the players in Execution 1 precisely (carrying out instructions as if they receive precisely the same messages at the same timeslots), except that they delay the dissemination of all messages until $t^* - 1$. At $t^* - 1$, players in X disseminate all messages that the players in Execution 1 disseminate at timeslots $< t^*$, and these messages are received by all active players by timeslot t^* . At timeslots

$\geq t^*$, players in X act precisely like honest players, except that they pretend all messages received from players in Y at timeslots $< t^*$ were received at t^* . Players in Y are honest.

Execution 4. This is the same as Execution 3, but with the roles of X and Y reversed. The set of active players is $X \cup Y$, and those players are active at all timeslots. Timeslot t^* is defined as before. Again, the environment sends $\mathbf{tr}_1$ to p_1 and $\mathbf{tr}_2$ to p_2 at timeslot 1 and does not send any further transactions. Now players in Y are Byzantine, ignore messages from players in X until t^* , and simulate the players in Execution 2 precisely (carrying out instructions as if they receive precisely the same messages at the same timeslots), except that they delay the dissemination of all messages until $t^* - 1$. At $t^* - 1$, players in Y disseminate all messages that the players in Execution 2 disseminate at timeslots $< t^*$. At timeslots $\geq t^*$, players in Y act precisely like honest players, except that they pretend all messages received from players in X at timeslots $< t^*$ were received at t^* . Players in Y are honest.

Analysis. We first prove that at least one of Executions 3 and 4 must see a consistency violation. To see this, suppose towards a contradiction that Execution 3 does not. Note that, until t^* , Execution 3 is indistinguishable from Execution 2 as far as the honest players in Y are concerned, i.e., they receive precisely the same inputs, messages, and oracle responses at each timeslot $< t^*$. It must therefore be the case that all players in Y regard $\mathbf{tr}_2$ as confirmed and $\mathbf{tr}_1$ as not confirmed (because it has not yet been received by those players) by timeslot $t^* - 1$. Let M^* be the set of messages received by all honest players by timeslot t^* . If there is no consistency violation, then it must be the case that $\mathcal{C}(M^*)$ is a sequence in which $\mathbf{tr}_1$ does not precede $\mathbf{tr}_2$.

In this case, consider Execution 4. Note that, until t^* , Execution 4 is indistinguishable from Execution 1 as far as the honest players in X are concerned, i.e., they receive precisely the same inputs, messages, and oracle responses at each timeslot $< t^*$. It must therefore be the case that all players in X regard $\mathbf{tr}_1$ as confirmed and $\mathbf{tr}_2$ as not confirmed by timeslot $t^* - 1$. Note next, however, that the set of messages received by all honest players by timeslot t^* is precisely the same set M^* in Executions 3 and 4. We concluded above that $\mathbf{tr}_1$ does not precede $\mathbf{tr}_2$ in $\mathcal{C}(M^*)$, meaning that Execution 4 sees a consistency violation at t^* .

To complete the proof, without loss of generality, suppose Execution 3 sees a consistency violation; the case that Execution 4 sees a consistency violation is symmetric. Towards a contradiction, suppose the protocol is EAAC with respect to the investment functions $\{\mathbf{R}_i(\cdot, \cdot)\}_{i \in [k]}$ and valuation function v . In that case, we must have $\alpha_B < 1$ at some timeslot $t_f > t^*$ in Execution 3 (and $\alpha_H \geq 1$ for all t). In that case, however, consider Execution 4. Because the set of messages received by each player by time t_f is the same in both executions, $\mathbf{R}_i(p, t_f)$ is also the same for every $i \in [k]$ and $p \in X \cup Y$. It follows that the valuation v is also the same (for both X and Y) at time t_f in the two

executions, and hence $\alpha_H < 1$ when evaluated at $t = t_f$ in Execution 4. This gives the required contradiction (violating (1) from Definition 3.1).

8. Impossibility result for the partially synchronous setting: The proof of Theorem 4.2.

Consider the quasi-permissionless setting and the partial synchrony model, and suppose the blockchain protocol $(\Sigma, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S})$ is ρ_l -resilient for liveness. We consider three non-empty and pairwise disjoint sets of players, X, Y , and Z , such that the following hold:

- $\mathcal{P} = X \cup Y \cup Z, |\mathcal{P}| = n$ (say);
- $|X| = |Z| = \lfloor n\rho_l \rfloor$;
- $|Y| = n - 2\lfloor n\rho_l \rfloor$.

The intuition. For the sake of simplicity, consider a pure proof-of-stake protocol, meaning a protocol that does not make use of external resources (although the formal proof below treats the general case). Suppose all players begin with a single unit of each form of stake and are active at all timeslots. The players in X and Z are honest, while the players in Y are Byzantine.

Because we are in the partial synchrony model, we may suppose that messages disseminated by players in X are received by players in $X \cup Y$ at the next timeslot but are not received by players in Z until after GST. Symmetrically, we may suppose that messages disseminated by players in Z are received by players in $Z \cup Y$ at the next timeslot but are not received by players in X until after GST. Suppose that the players in Y initially act towards those in X as if GST = 0 but the players in Z are Byzantine and are not disseminating messages. Because the players in Z own at most a ρ_l fraction of the stake and the protocol is ρ_l -resilient for liveness, the players in X must eventually confirm a sequence of transactions, which may include transactions transferring all stake from players in Y . If the players in Y simultaneously act towards those in Z as if GST = 0 but the players in X are Byzantine and are not disseminating messages, then the players in Z must eventually confirm a sequence of transactions, which may include transactions transferring all stake from players in Y . When GST arrives, this means that the honest players see a consistency violation, but by this time the players in Y have already cashed out all of their stake.

The formal proof. Fix arbitrary Γ -liquid investment functions and an arbitrary valuation function. We consider three protocol executions in which all parameters remain the same unless explicitly stated otherwise. The player set is always $X \cup Y \cup Z$ (as described above), and each player uses a single identifier (which we identify with the player). All players begin with a single unit of each form of stake (if there exist any such) and are always active. Let $\mathbf{tr}_1, \mathbf{tr}_2$ denote distinct transactions that are benign in the sense of section 2.4 and preserve the total amount of resources controlled by the players in each of X, Y , and Z (e.g., a simple transfer between two players of X). For $i = 1, 2$, let

$\mathbf{T}_i$ denote a set of transactions such that, no matter how they are ordered, $\mathbf{S}_h(\mathbf{S}_h^*, \mathbf{tr}_i * \mathbf{T}_i, y) = 0$ for all stake allocation functions $\mathbf{S}_h \in \mathcal{S}$ and players $y \in Y$. (The sets $\mathbf{T}_1$ and $\mathbf{T}_2$ exist according to the assumptions in section 2.4.) For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that $\Delta = 1$, but the proof is easily adapted to deal with larger values for Δ .

Execution 1. $\text{GST} = 0$. Players in X and Y are honest. Players in Z are Byzantine and do not disseminate messages. Players in X have a single unit of each form of external resource at each timeslot, while players in Y and Z do not own external resources. The environment sends a single transaction $\mathbf{tr}_1$ to a player $p_1 \in X$ at timeslot 1. At timeslot $2T_l$, the environment sends the transactions in $\mathbf{T}_1$ to p_1 .

Execution 2. This is similar to Execution 1 but with the roles of X and Z reversed. $\text{GST} = 0$. Players in Y and Z are honest. Players in X are Byzantine and do not disseminate messages. Players in Z have a single unit of each form of external resource at each timeslot, while players in X and Y do not own external resources. The environment sends a single transaction $\mathbf{tr}_2$ to a player $p_2 \in Z$ at timeslot 1. At timeslot $2T_l$, the environment sends the transactions in $\mathbf{T}_2$ to p_2 .

Execution 3. The execution is specified as follows:

- Players in $X \cup Z$ are honest, while players in Y are Byzantine.
- $\text{GST} = 3T_l + \Gamma$. Any message disseminated by a player in X at any timeslot t is received by players in $X \cup Y$ at the next timeslot but is not received by players in Z until $\max\{\text{GST}, t + 1\}$. Any message disseminated by a player in Z at any timeslot t is received by players in $Y \cup Z$ at the next timeslot but is not received by players in X until $\max\{\text{GST}, t + 1\}$.
- Players in $X \cup Z$ have a single unit of each form of external resource at each timeslot, while players in Y do not own external resources.
- The environment sends $\mathbf{tr}_1$ to p_1 and $\mathbf{tr}_2$ to p_2 at timeslot 1. At timeslot $2T_l$, the environment sends the transactions in $\mathbf{T}_1$ to p_1 and the transactions in $\mathbf{T}_2$ to p_2 . The environment then sends no further transactions.
- Each Byzantine player simulates two honest players. The first of these players acts honestly, except that they pretend messages sent by players in Z prior to GST do not arrive until GST . A message disseminated by this player at any timeslot t is received by players in $X \cup Y$ at the next timeslot but is not received by players in Z until $\max\{\text{GST}, t + 1\}$. The second of these simulated players acts honestly, except that they pretend messages sent by players in X prior to GST do not arrive until GST . A message disseminated by this player at any timeslot t is received by players in $Y \cup Z$ at the next timeslot but is not received by players in X until $\max\{\text{GST}, t + 1\}$.

Analysis. Note that, in Execution 1, the adversary is ρ_l -bounded. Since $\text{GST} = 0$, $\mathbf{tr}_1$ must be confirmed for all honest players by timeslot $1 + T_l$ (while $\mathbf{tr}_2$ is not, because this transaction is not received by any player). Similarly, the transactions sent to p_1 at $2T_l$ must be confirmed by $3T_l$; by the definition of $\mathbf{T}_1$, players in Y own no stake (of any form) at timeslots $\geq 3T_l$. Because the investment functions corresponding to $\mathbf{S}_1, \dots, \mathbf{S}_j$ are assumed to be Γ -liquid, $\mathbf{R}_h(p, 3T_l + \Gamma) = 0$ for all such investment functions and all $p \in Y$.

In Execution 2, the adversary is also ρ_l -bounded. Since $\text{GST} = 0$, $\mathbf{tr}_2$ must be confirmed for all honest players by timeslot $1 + T_l$ (while $\mathbf{tr}_1$ is not, because this transaction is not received by any player). Similarly, the transactions sent to p_2 at $2T_l$ must be confirmed by $3T_l$, meaning that players in Y own no stake (of any form) at timeslots $\geq 3T_l$. Because the investment functions corresponding to $\mathbf{S}_1, \dots, \mathbf{S}_j$ are assumed to be Γ -liquid, $\mathbf{R}_h(p, 3T_l + \Gamma) = 0$ for all such investment functions and all $p \in Y$.

To complete the argument, note that, for players in X , Execution 3 is indistinguishable from Execution 1 at all timeslots $< \text{GST}$, i.e., those players receive precisely the same inputs, messages, and oracle responses at all timeslots $< \text{GST}$. It follows that $\mathbf{tr}_1$ is confirmed for all players in X by timeslot $1 + T_l$ and that the transactions of $\mathbf{T}_1$ are confirmed for all players in X by timeslot $3T_l$. Similarly, for players in Z , Execution 3 is indistinguishable from Execution 2 at all timeslots $< \text{GST}$. It follows that $\mathbf{tr}_2$ is confirmed for all players in Z by timeslot $1 + T_l$ and that the transactions of $\mathbf{T}_2$ are confirmed for all players in Z by timeslot $3T_l$. It further follows that, in Execution 3, $\mathbf{R}_h(p, 3T_l + \Gamma) = 0$ for every investment function $\mathbf{R}_h$ and $p \in Y$.²⁹

A consistency violation is first seen by honest players at GST . For all choices of $t_f \geq \text{GST}$, the Byzantine players have already cashed out their stakes (and never possessed any external resources):

$$\sum_{p \in Y} \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbf{R}_i(p, t_f) \cdot C_i = 0$$

and hence $\alpha_B = 1$. The protocol therefore fails to be EAAC.

Interpretation for the synchronous model. As alluded to in section 5, the proof of Theorem 4.2 continues to hold in the synchronous model if $3T_l + \Gamma$ is less than the worst-case message delay Δ . That is, to avoid the impossibility result in Theorem 4.2, either the time to transaction confirmation or the time to recoup an investment off-chain (following a transaction confirmation on-chain) must scale with the worst-case message delay. For example, if typical network delays are much smaller

than worst-case delays and the speed of transaction confirmation in some PoS protocol scales with the former, then the “cooldown period” required before stake can be liquidated must scale with the latter (as it does, roughly, in the current Ethereum protocol).

9. A possibility result: The proof of Theorem 5.1.

9.1. Review of (permissioned) Tendermint.

To motivate the definition of our PoS protocol, in this subsection we give a somewhat informal description of a simplified specification of (permissioned) Tendermint. In this subsection, we therefore consider a set of n players, of which at most f may be Byzantine, where $n = 3f + 1$.

Technical preliminaries. In section 2, we supposed that a player’s state transition at a given timeslot can depend on the number of the current timeslot. This modeling choice serves to make our impossibility results as strong as possible but is a stronger assumption than is sometimes made when working in the partially synchronous model. For the sake of simplicity, we present a PoS version of Tendermint which makes use of this assumption to avoid the necessity of using a special procedure for *view synchronization*³⁰ (readers who are not familiar with view synchronization may disregard this comment without any loss of ability to follow the subsequent discussion). Similarly, we do not concern ourselves with issues of efficiency (e.g., communication complexity and latency) and aim only to present the simplest protocol meeting the required conditions.

In what follows, we assume that all messages are signed by the player disseminating them.

Views in Tendermint. The protocol instructions are divided into *views*. Within each view, we run two stages of voting, each of which is an opportunity for players to vote on a *block* (or blocks) of transactions proposed by the *leader* for the view (all these notions will be formalized in section 9.4). If the first stage of voting establishes a *stage 1 quorum certificate* (QC) for a block b , then the second stage may establish a *stage 2 QC* for b . Instructions within views are deterministic, so to ensure the protocol as a whole is deterministic one can simply specify a system of rotating leaders; e.g., if the players are $\{p_0, \dots, p_{n-1}\}$, then one can specify that the leader of view v , denoted by $\text{lead}(v)$, is p_i , where $i = v \bmod n$.

Each block of transactions b records the view to which it corresponds in the value $\mathbf{v}(b)$. If Q is a QC for b , then $\mathbf{v}(Q) = \mathbf{v}(b)$ and $\mathbf{b}(Q) = b$. The value $\mathbf{s}(Q)$ records whether Q is a stage 1 or a stage 2 QC.

Each player also maintains a variable Q^+ for the purpose of implementing a *locking* mechanism. Upon seeing a stage 1 QC while in view v , for b which is proposed by the leader of view v , an honest player p sets Q^+ to be that stage 1 QC for b .

When view v is executed. View v begins at time $3v\Delta$ and ends when view $v + 1$ begins.

Block proposals in Tendermint. Upon entering view v , the leader for the view lets Q be the stage 1 QC amongst all those it has seen such that $\mathbf{v}(Q)$ is greatest. Let $b' := \mathbf{b}(Q)$. The leader then disseminates a block proposal b , which records its *parent* b' in the value $\mathbf{par}(b)$, which records the view corresponding to the block in the value $\mathbf{v}(b)$, and which records a QC for the parent block in the value $\mathbf{QCprev}(b) := Q$. Any honest player receiving a proposal b while in view v will regard it as *valid* if it is signed by $\mathbf{lead}(v)$ and if $\mathbf{v}(b) = v$, $\mathbf{QCprev}(b)$ is a QC for the parent block $\mathbf{par}(b)$, and if $Q^+ \leq \mathbf{v}(Q)$ for $Q = \mathbf{QCprev}(b)$. If they regard the proposal as valid, honest players will then disseminate a stage 1 vote for b . Upon seeing a stage 1 QC for b (a set of $2f + 1$ stage 1 votes signed by distinct players) while in view v , they will set Q^+ to be that QC and will disseminate a stage 2 vote for b . Upon seeing any block with stage 1 and 2 QCs, honest players consider that block and all its ancestors *confirmed*. (Terms such as “ancestor” will be formally defined in section 9.4.)

The genesis block. We consider a fixed *genesis block*, denoted by b_g , with $\mathbf{v}(b_g) := 0$. All players have already begun to receive a QC for the genesis block and with Q^+ equal to that QC for the genesis block.

An informal version of the instructions is shown below:

The instructions for player p in view $v \geq 1$.

At timeslot $t = 3v\Delta$: If $p = \mathbf{lead}(v)$, then disseminate a new block, as specified above.

At timeslot $t = 3v\Delta + \Delta$: If p has seen a first valid block b for view v signed by $\mathbf{lead}(v)$, i.e., if $\mathbf{v}(b) = v$, $\mathbf{QCprev}(b)$ is a QC for the parent block $\mathbf{par}(b)$, and if $Q^+ \leq \mathbf{v}(Q)$ for $Q = \mathbf{QCprev}(b)$, then p disseminates a stage 1 vote for b .

At timeslot $t = 3v\Delta + 2\Delta$: If p has seen a stage 1 QC for a block b signed by $\mathbf{lead}(v)$, then set Q^+ to be that QC and disseminate a stage 2 vote for b .

Consistency and liveness for Tendermint. To argue that the protocol satisfies consistency, suppose towards a contradiction that there exists a least v such that the following hold:

- Some b with $\mathbf{v}(b) = v$ receives stage 1 and 2 QCs, Q_1 and Q_2 say.
- For some least $v' \geq v$, there exists b' such that b' is *incompatible* with b (i.e., neither b nor b' are ancestors of each other), with $\mathbf{v}(b') = v'$ and $\mathbf{QCprev}(b') = Q_0$ (say), and the block b' receives a stage 1 QC, Q_3 say.

If $v = v'$, then, since Q_1 and Q_3 both consist of $2f + 1$ votes and $n = 3f + 1$, some honest player must have votes in both Q_1 and Q_3 . This gives a contradiction, since each honest player sends at most one stage 1 vote in each view. So, suppose $v' > v$. Then some honest player p must have votes in both Q_2 and Q_3 . This gives the required contradiction, since p must set Q^+ so that

$\mathbf{v}(Q^+) = v$ while in view v , but our choice of (v, v') means that $\mathbf{v}(Q_0) < v$, so that p would not regard the proposal b' as valid while in view v' and would not produce a vote in Q_3 .

To argue briefly that the protocol satisfies liveness, let v be a view with honest leader p , which begins at time at least Δ after GST. Amongst all the values Q^+ for honest players at time $3v\Delta - \Delta$, let Q be that such that $\mathbf{v}(Q)$ is greatest. Then p must see Q by the beginning of view v and will therefore produce a block proposal b that all honest players regard as valid (since they cannot subsequently have updated their local value Q^+). All honest players will therefore produce stage 1 and stage 2 votes for b , meaning that b is confirmed for all honest players.

9.2. Key ideas in the recovery procedure.

In our protocol, honest players will reach consensus following a consistency violation using a recovery procedure based on (repeated instances of) a variant of the classic protocol of Dolev and Strong. In a first instance of the recovery procedure, a designated *leader* is asked to propose an updated genesis block. If this instance results in consensus amongst honest players on such a block b , then the honest majority of validating stake that remains after slashing can “sign off” on this value, producing a form of *certificate* in support of b . If not, a second leader is then asked to propose an updated genesis block, and so on.

In this section, we present a variant on the Dolev–Strong protocol, in which there is a set P of n players, of which at most f may be Byzantine, and one of which is the designated *leader*. In our recovery procedure, a modified form of the protocol will be used, in which honest players will ignore values proposed by leaders unless they are a suitable proposal for an updated genesis block (see the definition of “ M -admissible genesis proposals” in section 9.5).

Notation for signed messages. For any message m , and for distinct players $p_1, \dots, p_t$, we let $m_{p_1, \dots, p_t}$ be m signed by $p_1, \dots, p_t$ in order; i.e., for the empty sequence $\emptyset$, $m_\emptyset$ is m , and for each $i \in [1, t]$, $m_{p_1, \dots, p_i}$ is $m_{p_1, \dots, p_{i-1}}$ signed by p_i . Let X_t be the set of all messages of the form $m_{p_1, \dots, p_t}$ such that $p_1, \dots, p_t$ are all distinct players in P and p_1 is the leader.

Initial setup. Each player p maintains a set O_p , which can be thought of as the set of values that p recognizes as having been sent by the leader and which is initially empty. The leader begins with an input value z .

The instructions for player p .

Time 0. If p is the leader, then disseminate z_p to all players and enumerate z into O_p .

Time $t\Delta^*$ with $1 \leq t \leq f + 1$. Consider the set of messages $m \in X_t$ received by time $t\Delta^*$. For each such message $m = y_{p_1, \dots, p_t}$, if $y \notin O_p$, proceed as follows: Enumerate y into O_p , and, if $t < f + 1$, disseminate m_p to all players.

The output for player p . After executing all other instructions at time $(f + 1)\Delta^*$, p outputs y if O_p contains the single value y , and otherwise p outputs $\perp$.

Proving that the protocol functions correctly. The key claim is that all honest players produce the same output (possibly $\perp$), whether the leader is honest or Byzantine. If the leader is honest and begins with input z , then every honest player p other than the leader enumerates z into O_p at time Δ^* and does not enumerate any other value into this set at any time. All honest players therefore produce a common output z which, moreover, is the input of the honest leader.

We can complete the proof by showing that if any honest player p enumerates a particular value y into O_p , then all honest players do so (even if the leader is Byzantine). There are two cases to consider:

- **Case 1.** Suppose that some honest p first enumerates y into O_p at time $t\Delta^*$ with $t < f + 1$. In this case, p receives a message of the form $m = y_{p_1, \dots, p_t} \in X_t$ at $t\Delta^*$. Player p then adds their signature to form a message with $t + 1$ distinct signatures and disseminates this message to all players. This means every honest player p' will enumerate y into $O_{p'}$ by time $(t + 1)\Delta^*$.
- **Case 2.** Suppose next that some honest p first enumerates y into O_p at time $(f + 1)\Delta^*$. In this case, p receives a message of the form $m = y_{p_1, \dots, p_{f+1}} \in X_{f+1}$ at time $(f + 1)\Delta^*$, which has $f + 1$ distinct signatures attached. At least one of those signatures must be from an honest player p' (since there are at most f Byzantine players), meaning that Case 1 applies w.r.t. p' .

9.3. Informal overview of further required changes.


Recall that PosT is our proof-of-stake version of Tendermint, used to prove Theorem 5.1. Section 6 described, at a high level, some of the innovations involved: the holding of stake “in escrow,” the use of epochs, certificates of guilt, the use of a recovery procedure, and so on. One further significant point concerns how to deal appropriately with the change of validators at the end of each epoch.

How to complete an epoch. The complication is as follows.

The problem. We claimed in section 6 that, should message delay prior to GST be bounded by Δ^* , any consistency violation during epoch e will lead to active honest players receiving a corresponding certificate of guilt within time $2\Delta^*$ of any honest player beginning epoch $e + 1$. The basic idea to specify the length of each epoch is therefore that we wish to choose some x such that $x\Delta > \Delta^*$, so that $3x\Delta$ (the time to complete x views³¹) is certainly larger than $2\Delta^*$, and then have epoch e be

responsible for confirming blocks of heights in $(ex, (e + 1)x]$ (block height will be formally defined in section 9.4). The way the Tendermint protocol functions (at least as specified in section 9.1), however, a block may only receive a stage 1 QC and become confirmed because a descendant subsequently receives a stage 2 QC. If b is of height $(e + 1)x$, and so potentially ends an epoch, and if b only receives a stage 1 QC, then the question becomes, “Who should we have propose and vote on children of b ?” We cannot allow the validator change at the end of the epoch to be dictated by the transactions in b and its ancestors (and immediately have the new validators propose descendants of b), because b is not confirmed. Another block b' of the same height might also receive a stage 1 QC, leading to different opinions as to who should be the validator set for the next epoch.

The solution. The solution we employ is to allow the validators for epoch e to continue proposing and voting on blocks of heights greater than $(e + 1)x$, until they produce a confirmed block of height $(e + 1)x$ (illustrated in Figure 5). Once they do so, the blocks they have produced of height $> (e + 1)x$ (together with the votes for those blocks) are kept as part of the “chain data” that verifies the validity of the chain but are not used to constitute part of the chain of confirmed transactions; i.e., the validators for the next epoch begin building above b of height $(e + 1)x$. It is crucial that the transactions in these extra blocks not be considered confirmed, because the validators for the next epoch have not been present to implement the locking mechanism during epoch e , meaning that if one of these blocks b' is confirmed, then we cannot guarantee that at least a third of the new validators (weighted by stake) are honest and locked on b' .³²



The need for three stages of voting in each view. Similar to HotStuff [47], we will use three stages of voting in each view, so that the transactions in a block (together with those of its ancestors) are confirmed when the block receives stage 1, 2 and 3 QCs. The motivation for doing so, however, is different than for HotStuff (where the goals were performance-driven, specifically to achieve a form of “optimistic responsiveness”). The motivation here is to ensure that if there is a consistency

violation amongst the blocks for epoch $e - 1$, then active honest players will receive a corresponding “certificate of guilt” before the end of epoch e .³³

The problem. To see the problem if we only use two stages of voting, consider the following possible sequence of events. Suppose a block b is proposed during view v and receives a stage 1 QC. The block then receives stage 2 votes from a fraction of the honest stake that is small but sufficient enough that the adversary can produce a stage 2 QC for b at any later time of its choosing. In view $v + 1$, a block b' that is incompatible with b then receives stage 1 and stage 2 QCs, ending the epoch. Note that, in this case, the adversary can produce the stage 2 QC for b and the corresponding consistency violation after any delay of its choosing. Once it does so, the stage 2 QC for b , together with the stage 1 QC for b' , will constitute a certificate of guilt (so long as votes are defined to include the $\mathbf{QC}_{\text{prev}}$ value for the block on which they vote), but by the time this is seen by honest players, the adversary’s validating stake may no longer be in escrow.

The solution. Now suppose that we use three stages of voting within each view and that, as before, an honest player sets their lock (redefines Q^+) upon seeing a stage 1 QC for the block proposal during view v . Suppose message delay prior to GST is bounded by Δ^* . A block is confirmed when some descendant (possibly the block itself) receives stage 1, 2, and 3 QCs. A player enters epoch $e + 1$ upon seeing any confirmed block for epoch e of height $(e + 1)x$. Suppose there exists a consistency violation amongst the epoch e blocks. In this case, there must exist a least v and a least $v' \geq v$ such that some block b with $\mathbf{v}(b) = v$ receives stage 1, 2, and 3 QCs, and some incompatible block b' with $\mathbf{v}(b') = v'$ also receives stage 1, 2, and 3 QCs. Crucially, because $\rho^* < 2/3$, the production of any QC requires the participation of at least one honest player. Let v'' be the least view $\geq v$ such that some block b'' that is incompatible with b (with $\mathbf{v}(b'') = v''$) receives a stage 1 QC, Q_1 say, that is seen by some honest player p_1 before they enter epoch $e + 1$. Note that $v'' \leq v'$. Let Q_2 be a stage 2 QC for b that is seen by an honest player p_2 before sending a stage 3 vote during view v . Since we will be able to argue (essentially just as in section 9.1) that Q_1 and Q_2 constitute an appropriate certificate of guilt, it remains to show that these QCs will be seen by all active honest players within time $2\Delta^*$ of any honest player entering epoch $e + 1$.

If some first honest player enters epoch $e + 1$ at timeslot t , then all active honest players do so by $t + \Delta^*$. This means p_i (for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, as specified above) must enter epoch $e + 1$ by $t + \Delta^*$ and, since p_i sees Q_i before $t + \Delta^*$, Q_i must be seen by all active honest players by time $t + 2\Delta^*$. All active honest players therefore see Q_1 and Q_2 by time $t + 2\Delta^*$, as required.

Overall summary of the PosT protocol. Before giving a formal protocol specification, we informally review the different phases of the PosT protocol.

Before the recovery procedure is triggered. During “normal” operation (i.e., while not under attack), PosT acts essentially like a version of Tendermint, but with three phases of voting in each view, and with the set of players that are responsible for proposing and voting on blocks (i.e., the “validators”) changing with each epoch. To act as a validator, players must place stake in escrow. Removal of stake from escrow is subject to a delay of one epoch, with the duration of each epoch greater than $2\Delta^*$. Since any consistency violation during epoch e will be seen by honest players before epoch $e + 1$ is completed, this suffices to ensure that Byzantine players contributing to a consistency violation can be “slashed” before their stake is removed from escrow. Since PosT acts essentially like Tendermint in all other respects, in the case that the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1/3$, the protocol achieves liveness with respect to a parameter T_l that depends on Δ only (i.e., T_l is independent of Δ^*) and also satisfies consistency.

Once the recovery procedure is triggered. If a consistency violation occurs in some least epoch e , then active honest players will see a corresponding certificate of guilt before epoch $e + 1$ completes and will trigger the recovery procedure. Once the recovery procedure is triggered, the validators for epoch e then carry out repeated instances of the Dolev–Strong protocol to determine an updated genesis block. This updated genesis block will contain all transactions confirmed prior to epoch e , and also certificates of guilt for at least $1/3$ of the validating stake for epoch e , and will be signed by the honest majority of validating stake that remains after slashing (using that $\rho^* < 2/3$). If desired, the main protocol can resume operation from this new genesis block.

9.4. The formal specification of the main protocol (prior to recovery).

We give a specification that is aimed at simplicity of presentation, and do not concern ourselves with issues of efficiency, such as communication complexity and latency. It is convenient to assume that whenever honest p disseminates a message at some timeslot t , p regards that dissemination as having been received (by p) at the next timeslot. We assume that all messages are signed by the player disseminating the message.

Transaction gossiping and the variable $\mathbf{T}^*$. We assume that, whenever any honest player first receives a transaction $\mathbf{tr}$, it disseminates $\mathbf{tr}$ at the same timeslot. Each honest player p maintains a variable $\mathbf{T}^*$, which is the set of all transactions received by p thus far.

The stake allocation function. We take as given an initial distribution $\mathbf{S}^*$. The stake allocation function $\mathbf{S}$ should be thought of as specifying the amount of stake a player has in escrow and which has not been earmarked for removal from escrow (after one epoch), i.e., a player’s validating stake. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that the total number of units of currency is fixed at some value $N \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ and that, for some determined $x^* \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ dividing N , each identifier can hold either 0 or N/x^* units of currency in escrow (this still allows a player to put large amounts of stake in escrow by using multiple identifiers). Stake is added or removed from escrow via special

transactions: an *add-to-escrow* transaction corresponding to identifier id is used to put stake in escrow, while a *remove-from-escrow* transaction corresponding to id is used to remove stake from escrow. To specify how the stake may be updated, we stipulate that players may create and disseminate “epoch” transactions that will be used to mark the end of each epoch. “Certificates of guilt” will also be formally defined in what follows as a special form of transaction. For any given certificate of guilt G and any identifier id , G may or may not *implicate* the identifier id . We require that S satisfies the following conditions:³⁴

1. If T_2 does not contain any epoch transactions, then $S(S^*, T_1 * T_2, id) = S(S^*, T_1, id)$; i.e., S only updates at the end of an epoch.
2. Suppose T ends with an epoch transaction. If T contains an add-to-escrow transaction corresponding to id that is not followed (in T) by a remove-from-escrow transaction corresponding to id , and also T contains no certificate of guilt implicating id , then $S(S^*, T, id) = N/x^*$. Otherwise, $S(S^*, T, id) = 0$.³⁵

The length of an epoch. Choose $x > 2x^*$ (where x^* is as specified above)³⁶ and such that $x\Delta > \Delta^*$. We think of epoch e as being responsible for confirming blocks of heights in $(ex, (e+1)x]$ (block height will be formally defined below). We will later specify a value $e(b)$ corresponding to each block b , which records the epoch of the block. We will say a block b is *epoch e ending* if $e(b) = e$ and b is of height $(e+1)x$.

The genesis block. We consider a fixed *genesis block* b_g . We set $h(b_g) = e(b_g) = v(b_g) = 0$. These values indicate the *height* of the block, as well as the epoch and view numbers corresponding to the block, respectively. We consider the empty set, denoted by $\emptyset$, a stage 1 QC for b_g , and we set $b(\emptyset) = b_g$, $e(\emptyset) = v(\emptyset) = 0$. No set of messages is a stage 2 QC for b_g . The block b_g has no parent, has only itself as an ancestor, and is M -valid for any set of messages M .

The variable M . Each player p maintains a variable M , which is the set of all messages received by p thus far: Initially, M is set to be $\{b_g\}$.

Blocks. A block b other than the genesis block is entirely specified by the following values:

$h(b)$: the height of b .

$v(b)$: the view corresponding to b .

$e(b)$: the epoch corresponding to b .

$\text{par}(b)$: The parent of b . We also call b a *child* of $\text{par}(b)$. The ancestors of b are b and all ancestors of $\text{par}(b)$. The *descendants* of any block b are b and all the descendants of its children. Two blocks

are *incompatible* if neither is an ancestor of the other. For b to be M -valid, the following must hold:

- $b \in M$;
- $\text{par}(b)$ is M -valid;
- the ancestors of b include b_g ;
- $h(b) = h(\text{par}(b)) + 1$;
- if $\text{par}(b)$ is epoch $e = \mathbf{e}(\text{par}(b))$ ending, then $\mathbf{e}(b)$ is e or $e + 1$,³⁷
- if $\text{par}(b)$ is not epoch $e = \mathbf{e}(\text{par}(b))$ ending, then $\mathbf{e}(b) = e$.

$\text{QCprev}(b)$: This value plays a role similar to that in section 9.1. For b to be M -valid, the following must hold:

- M must contain $\text{QCprev}(b)$;
- $\text{QCprev}(b)$ must be a stage 1 QC for $\text{par}(b)$.

$\mathbf{T}(b)$: The sequence of transactions in b . For b to be M -valid, we require that $\mathbf{T}(b)$ ends with an epoch transaction iff b is epoch $\mathbf{e}(b)$ ending.³⁸ We set $\mathbf{T}(b_g) = \emptyset$.

$\mathbf{Tr}(b)$: The sequence of transactions in all ancestors of b . For b to be M -valid, we require that $\mathbf{Tr}(b) = \mathbf{Tr}(\text{par}(b)) * \mathbf{T}(b)$. We set $\mathbf{Tr}(b_g) = \emptyset$.

$\mathbf{Tval}(b)$: The sequence of transactions used to determine who should vote on b . We set $\mathbf{Tval}(b_g) = \emptyset$. For b to be M -valid, we require the following:

- if $\mathbf{e}(b) = \mathbf{e}(\text{par}(b))$, then $\mathbf{Tval}(b) = \mathbf{Tval}(\text{par}(b))$;
- if $\mathbf{e}(b) = \mathbf{e}(\text{par}(b)) + 1$, then $\mathbf{Tval}(b) = \mathbf{Tr}(\text{par}(b))$.

Votes. A vote V is entirely specified by the following values:

$\mathbf{b}(V)$: the block for which V is a vote.

$\mathbf{c}(V)$: the amount of stake corresponding to the vote.

$\mathbf{s}(V)$: the stage of the vote (1, 2, or 3).

$\mathbf{id}(V)$: For the vote to be *valid*, it must be signed by $\mathbf{id}(V)$.

$\mathbf{vprev}(V)$: For the vote to be valid, this must equal $\mathbf{v}(\text{QCprev}(\mathbf{b}(V)))$.

Quorum certificates. Let $\mathbf{T} := \mathbf{Tval}(b)$, and set

$$\mathbf{N}(b) := \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{id \in \text{id}(p)} \mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id).$$

For any block b other than b_g , and for $s \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, we say a set of valid votes Q is a *stage s QC* for b if the following conditions are all satisfied:

- i. for each $V \in Q$, we have $\mathbf{b}(V) = b$, and $\mathbf{s}(V) = s$;
- ii. for each $V \in Q$, it holds that $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, \text{id}(V)) = \mathbf{c}(V)$;
- iii. there do not exist $V \neq V'$ in Q with $\text{id}(V) = \text{id}(V')$;
- iv. $\sum_{V \in Q} \mathbf{c}(V) \geq \frac{2}{3} \mathbf{N}(b)$.

If Q is a stage s QC for b , we define $\mathbf{b}(Q) := b$, $\mathbf{e}(Q) := \mathbf{e}(b)$, $\mathbf{v}(Q) := \mathbf{v}(b)$, $\mathbf{vprev}(Q) = \mathbf{v}(\mathbf{QCprev}(b))$, and $\mathbf{s}(Q) := s$.

In an abuse of notation, we'll say $Q \in M$ when every element of Q is in M .

Recall that $\mathbf{Tval}(b)$ is the sequence of transactions used to determine who should vote on b . So, this sequence determines the “validating stake.” The conditions above stipulate that votes from $2/3$ of the validating stake are required to form a QC. Note that we are guaranteed $\frac{2}{3} \mathbf{N}(b)$ honest validating stake if the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1/3$.

Defining the confirmation rule. A block b is M -confirmed if there exists a descendant b' of b with $\mathbf{e}(b') = \mathbf{e}(b)$, such that b' is M -valid with stage 1, 2, and 3 QCs in M , and if it also holds that b is of height $\leq (\mathbf{e}(b) + 1)x$. Let b be of greatest height amongst the M -confirmed blocks. The sequence of M -confirmed transactions is $\mathbf{Tr}(b)$.³⁹

For any block b other than b_g to be M -valid, we require the following:

- If $\mathbf{e}(b) > \mathbf{e}(\text{par}(b))$, then $\text{par}(b)$ is M -confirmed.

M -validity. A block is M -valid if it satisfies all of the conditions for M -validity listed above (in this section).

Defining certificates of guilt. A *certificate of guilt* for epoch e (considered a special form of transaction) is a pair of QCs (Q, Q') such that the following hold:

- Q is a stage 2 QC for some b with $\mathbf{e}(b) = e$ and $\mathbf{v}(b) = v$ (say);
- Q' is a stage 1 QC for some b' with $\mathbf{e}(b') = e$ and $\mathbf{v}(b') = v'$ (say);
- b' is incompatible with b ;
- $v' \geq v$ and $\mathbf{vprev}(Q') < v$.

A certificate of guilt (Q, Q') *implicates* id if there exist votes $V \in Q, V' \in Q'$ with $\text{id}(V) = \text{id}(V') = id$. (Of course, we will show that a certificate of guilt can only implicate the identifiers of Byzantine players.)

The local variable Q^+ . This plays a role similar to that in section 9.1. Initially, $Q^+ := \emptyset$; i.e. Q^+ is set to be a stage 1 QC for b_g .

The local variable e . The value e records the current epoch for p . Initially, $e = 0$.

The local value rec . This is initially 0 and is set to 1 to indicate that p should start executing instructions for the recovery procedure.

The `eupdate` procedure. The following procedure is called `eupdate` and is responsible for updating e when run by p :

1. If $\text{rec} = 0$, then let e be the greatest integer such that there exists a block b which is M -confirmed and epoch e ending; or, if there exists no such e , let $e = -1$. Set $e := e + 1$. If this is the first timeslot at which $e = e + 1$, then we say *epoch $e + 1$ begins at t for p* .
2. If $\text{rec} = 1$ and M contains a certificate of guilt for epoch $e - 1$, set $e := e - 1$.

(1) *above specifies the present epoch for p before the recovery procedure is triggered. This is defined in the obvious way: p looks to see which epoch it has seen completed and begins work on the next epoch. (2) updates the epoch when the recovery procedure is triggered because of a consistency violation in epoch $e - 1$. If the recovery procedure is triggered because of a consistency violation in epoch e , there is no need to update e .*

When p is ready to enter the recovery procedure. We say p is *ready to enter the recovery procedure* at t if either of the following holds:

- M contains a certificate of guilt for epoch $e - 1$.
- Epoch e began for p at a timeslot $t' < t - 2\Delta^*$, and M contains a certificate of guilt for epoch e .

The conditions above specify when the recovery procedure is triggered and stipulate that one must wait time $2\Delta^$ after entering epoch e before triggering the recovery procedure because of a consistency violation in epoch e . This is to give sufficient time for a consistency violation in the previous epoch to be revealed and to ensure that the recovery procedure is only triggered because of a consistency violation in a single epoch.*

The function `Qset`. This function is used to update Q^+ after entering a new epoch and is defined as follows. Amongst the M -confirmed and epoch $e - 1$ ending blocks, choose b such that $\mathbf{v}(b)$ takes the greatest value. Let Q be some stage 1 QC for b , and define $\text{Qset}(M, e) := Q$.

Defining $\text{lead}(M, \mathbf{e}, v)$. Player p 's belief as to who should be the leader for view v depends on their values M and $\mathbf{e}$. If there does not exist a unique $b \in M$ which is M -confirmed and epoch $\mathbf{e} - 1$ ending, then $\text{lead}(M, \mathbf{e}, v)$ is undefined.⁴⁰ Otherwise, let b be such a block and set $\mathbf{T} := \text{Tr}(b)$ and $v' := \mathbf{v}(b)$. Recall our assumption that, for some determined $x^* \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$, if $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) > 0$, then $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) = N/x^*$. Let $id_0, \dots, id_{k-1}$ be an enumeration of the identifiers id such that $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) > 0$. For $i \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$, we define $\text{lead}(M, \mathbf{e}, v' + i)$ to be the identifier id_j , where $j = i \bmod k$.

Admissible blocks. When p determines whether to vote on a block b in view v , it will only do so if the block is *admissible*. At any point, p regards b as admissible for view v if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

- b is M -valid;
- $\mathbf{v}(b) = v$, and b is signed by $\text{lead}(M, \mathbf{e}, v)$;
- $\mathbf{v}(Q^+) \leq \mathbf{v}(\text{QCprev}(b))$;
- $\mathbf{e}(b) = \mathbf{e}$;

The disseminate new block procedure. If $\text{lead}(M, \mathbf{e}, v)$ (as locally defined for p) is an identifier $id \in \text{id}(p)$, then, at the beginning of view v , p proceeds as follows in order to specify and disseminate a new block:

1. Amongst the M -valid b' with a stage 1 QC in M such that $\mathbf{e}(b') = \mathbf{e}$, choose b' such that $\mathbf{v}(b')$ is maximal and set Q to be a stage 1 QC for b' in M . Or, if there exists no such block in M , set $Q := \text{Qset}(M, \mathbf{e})$ and let $b' := \mathbf{b}(Q)$.
2. Let $\mathbf{T}$ be the set of transactions in $\mathbf{T}^* - \text{Tr}(b')$. Let b be a new block with $\mathbf{e}(b) = \mathbf{e}$, $\mathbf{v}(b) = v$, $\text{par}(b) = b'$, $\text{QCprev}(b) = Q$, $\mathbf{T}(b)$ the transactions of $\mathbf{T}$ (in some arbitrary order and, if appropriate, concluding with a transaction indicating the end of epoch $\mathbf{e}$), and which satisfies all conditions for M -validity (note that these conditions suffice to specify $\mathbf{Tval}(b)$ and $\mathbf{h}(b)$).
3. Disseminate b , signed by id .

The pseudocode. The pseudocode is described in Algorithm 1.

9.5. The formal specification of the recovery procedure.

Upon setting $\text{rec} := 1$, indicating that the recovery procedure is triggered, player p will run the **update** procedure, which will set $\mathbf{e}$ to be the least epoch in which a consistency violation occurs. The aim of the recovery procedure is then to reach consensus on an updated genesis block b'_g at which the slashing instructions have been carried out. To specify b'_g , one need only specify the transactions in b'_g , although honest players will also produce votes for b'_g , ensuring that it is uniquely determined.

M -admissible genesis proposals. Let M and $\mathbf{e}$ be as locally defined for p during the recovery procedure. Let b be an epoch $\mathbf{e} - 1$ ending block that is M -confirmed, and set $\mathbf{T} := \mathbf{Tr}(b)$. A genesis proposal (b'_g, i) is M -admissible if $\mathbf{T}(b'_g) = \mathbf{T} * \mathbf{G} * \mathbf{tr}$, where $\mathbf{G}$ is a certificate of guilt for epoch $\mathbf{e}$ and $\mathbf{tr}$ is an epoch transaction. The second coordinate i in the genesis proposal (b'_g, i) indicates that the proposal is made during the i th instance of the Dolev–Strong protocol.

Defining $\mathbf{reclead}(M, i)$ and $\mathbf{signed}(M, i, j)$. We use a similar notation for signed messages as in section 9.2. For any message m , and for distinct identifiers $id_1, \dots, id_j$, we let $m_{id_1, \dots, id_j}$ be m signed by $id_1, \dots, id_j$ in order. As above, let M and $\mathbf{e}$ be as locally defined for p during the recovery procedure. Let b be an epoch $\mathbf{e} - 1$ ending block that is M -confirmed, and set $\mathbf{T} := \mathbf{Tr}(b)$. Let $id_0, \dots, id_{k-1}$ be an enumeration of the identifiers id such that $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) > 0$ and set $\mathbf{Id}(M) := \{id_0, \dots, id_{k-1}\}$. For $i \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$, we define $\mathbf{reclead}(M, i)$ to be the identifier id_j , where $j = i \bmod k$. This value specifies the leader for the i th instance of the Dolev–Strong protocol.

For $i \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$ and $j \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 1}$, we define $\mathbf{signed}(M, i, j)$ to be the set of all messages in M which are of the form $m_{id'_1, \dots, id'_j}$, such that m is an M -admissible genesis proposal (b'_g, i) and $id'_1, \dots, id'_j$ are all distinct members of $\mathbf{Id}(M)$, with $id'_1 = \mathbf{reclead}(M, i)$.

The variable O_p . This plays the same role as in section 9.2.

Votes for the final output. Honest players will disseminate *output votes* for a value b'_g that may be used as an updated genesis block. These output votes V are entirely specified by three values $\mathbf{b}(V)$, $\mathbf{c}(V)$, and $\mathbf{id}(V)$ and must be signed by $\mathbf{id}(V)$ to be valid.

Algorithm 1. The instructions for player p before the recovery procedure is triggered.

1:	At timeslot 1:	
2:		Set $\mathbf{end} := 0, \mathbf{rec} := 0$;
3:		
4:	At every timeslot t if $\mathbf{end} = 0$:	
5:	$\mathbf{eupdate}$;	▷ Defined in section 9.4, responsible for updating $\mathbf{e}$

6:		If epoch e begins at t for p then set $Q^+ := \text{Qset}(M, e)$;	▷ Set Q^+ at start of epoch
7:		If p is ready to enter the recovery procedure then:	▷ Condition defined in section 9.4
8:		Set $\text{rec} := 1$ and perform eupdate ;	▷ Start recovery procedure
9:		Set $\text{end} := 1$.	
10:			
11:		At timeslot $4v\Delta$ for $v \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ if $\text{end} = 0$:	
12:		If $\text{lead}(M, e, v) \in \text{id}(p)$ then disseminate new block;	▷ Disseminate a new block
13:			
14:		At timeslot $4v\Delta + \Delta$ for $v \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ if $\text{end} = 0$:	
15:		Set $\mathbf{b}^*$ to be undefined;	
16:		If there exists a first b enumerated into M which is admissible for view v then:	
17:		Set $\mathbf{b}^* := b$ and $\mathbf{T} := \text{Tval}(b)$, $Q := \text{QCprev}(b)$;	
18:		For each $id \in \text{id}(p)$ such that $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) > 0$:	▷ Disseminate stage 1 votes
19:		Let $c := \mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id)$;	
20:		Disseminate V with $\mathbf{b}(V) = \mathbf{b}^*$, $c(V) = c$, $\mathbf{s}(V) = 1$, $\text{id}(V) = id$, $\mathbf{vprev}(V) = \mathbf{v}(Q)$;	
21:			
22:		At timeslot $4v\Delta + 2\Delta$ for $v \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ if $\text{end} = 0$:	
23:		If $\mathbf{b}^* \downarrow$ and M contains a stage 1 QC for $\mathbf{b}^*$ then:	
24:		Set Q^+ to be a stage 1 QC for $\mathbf{b}^*$ in M ;	▷ Set new lock
25:		For each $id \in \text{id}(p)$ such that $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) > 0$:	▷ Disseminate stage 2 votes

26:		Let $c := \mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id)$;	
27:		Disseminate V with $\mathbf{b}(V) = \mathbf{b}^*, c(V) = c, \mathbf{s}(V) = 2, id(V) = id,$ $\mathbf{vprev}(V) = \mathbf{v}(Q)$;	
28:			
29:	At timeslot $4v\Delta + 3\Delta$ for $v \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$ if $\mathbf{end} = 0$:		
30:		If $\mathbf{b}^* \downarrow$ and M contains a stage 2 QC for $\mathbf{b}^*$ then:	
31:		For each $id \in id(p)$ such that $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) > 0$:	▷ Disseminate stage 3 votes
32:		Let $c := \mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id)$;	
33:		Disseminate V with $\mathbf{b}(V) = \mathbf{b}^*, c(V) = c, \mathbf{s}(V) = 3, id(V) = id,$ $\mathbf{vprev}(V) = \mathbf{v}(Q)$;	

The pseudocode. The pseudocode is described in Algorithm 2.⁴¹

Algorithm 2. Recovery procedure instructions for p : to be carried out when $\mathbf{rec} = 1$.

1:	At timeslot $4\Delta((\mathbf{e} + 2)x + 1)$:		▷ Initialization
2:		Set $\mathbf{recend} := 0$;	
3:		Let b be epoch $\mathbf{e} - 1$ ending and M -confirmed; Set $\mathbf{T} := \mathbf{Tr}(b)$;	
4:		Set $k = \{id : \mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) > 0\} $;	▷ Number of participants
5:		Set $t_i := 4\Delta((\mathbf{e} + 2)x + 1) + (k + 1)i\Delta^*, i \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$;	▷ First instance of Dolev–Strong begins at t_0
6:			
7:	At timeslot t_i for $i \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$ if $\mathbf{recend} = 0$: ▷ Begin i th instance of Dolev–Strong		
8:		Set $O_p = \emptyset$;	
9:		If $\mathbf{reclead}(M, i) \in id(p)$ then:	▷ Propose updated genesis block
10:		Disseminate a genesis proposal (b'_g, i) signed by $\mathbf{reclead}(M, i)$ which is M -admissible;	

11:			
12:	At timeslot $t_i + j\Delta^*$ for $i \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$ and $j \in [1, k]$ if $\text{recend} = 0$:		
13:		For each message $m = y_{id'_1, \dots, id'_j}$ in $\text{signed}(M, i, j)$:	▷ Multi-signed M -admissible proposals
14:		If $y \notin O_p$ and $j < k$:	
15:		For each $id \in \text{id}(p)$ such that $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) > 0$, disseminate m_{id} ;	
16:		If $y \notin O_p$, enumerate y into O_p;	
17:			
18:	At timeslot $t_i + k\Delta^*$ if $\text{recend} = 0$:		▷ End of i th instance of Dolev-Strong
19:		If O_p contains a single value (b'_g, i) then:	▷ Send votes for updated genesis block
20:		For each $id \in \text{id}(p)$ such that $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) > 0$:	
21:		Let $c := \mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id)$;	
22:		Disseminate output vote V with $\mathbf{b}(V) = b'_g, \mathbf{c}(V) = c, \text{id}(V) = id$;	
23:		Set $\text{recend} := 1$.	▷ Terminate

9.6. Certificates of guilt and consistency.

In this section, we show that the protocol is consistent for ρ -bounded adversaries when $\rho < 1/3$. In the next section, we show liveness.

Further terminology. We let $\mathcal{M}^*$ be the set of all messages disseminated during an execution. If $id \in \text{id}(p)$ and p is Byzantine, then we say id is Byzantine.

LEMMA 9.1.

If a certificate of guilt in $\mathcal{M}^$ implicates id , then id is Byzantine.*

Proof.

Let (Q, Q') be a certificate of guilt for epoch e , and let b, b', v, v' be as specified in the definition of certificates of guilt in section 9.4. Suppose there exist votes $V \in Q$ and $V' \in Q'$ with $\text{id}(V) = \text{id}(V') = \text{id}$, and let p be such that $\text{id} \in \text{id}(p)$. If $v = v'$, then the claim is immediate because honest players do not vote for two different blocks in the same view (b^* is defined at most once in each view, line 17 of Algorithm 1). If $v' > v$, then the claim follows because, if p is honest, then it must set $Q^+ := v$ upon disseminating V while in view v (line 24 of Algorithm 1), and then could not disseminate $V' \in Q'$ because $\text{vprev}(Q') < v$; i.e., p would not regard $b(Q')$ as admissible when voting in view v' . $\square$

Next, recall that $\rho^* < 2/3$. In particular, every quorum certificate must contain at least one vote from an honest player. Thus, for $s = 2, 3$, no stage s QC can be formed for a block b without some honest player previously seeing a stage $s - 1$ QC for b . Similarly, no stage 1 QC can be formed for a block b without some honest player seeing a stage 1 QC for b 's parent.

LEMMA 9.2.

Suppose two incompatible blocks for epoch e are both $\mathcal{M}^$ -confirmed. Then $\mathcal{M}^*$ contains a certificate of guilt for epoch e . Let t be the first timeslot at which any honest player enters epoch $e + 1$ or sets their local value $\text{rec} := 1$ (i.e., starts the recovery procedure). If message delay prior to GST is bounded by Δ^* , then all active honest players receive a certificate of guilt for epoch e by time $t + 2\Delta^*$.*

Proof.

In the argument that follows, we restrict our attention to blocks b with $\mathbf{e}(b) = e$. Given the conditions in the statement of the lemma, there must exist a least v , a least $v' \geq v$, and incompatible blocks b and b' which both receive stage 1, 2, and 3 QCs in $\mathcal{M}^*$, such that $\mathbf{v}(b) = v$ and $\mathbf{v}(b') = v'$. Let v'' be the least view $\geq v$ such that some block b'' that is incompatible with b (with $\mathbf{v}(b'') = v''$) receives a stage 1 QC, Q_1 say, that is seen by some honest player p_1 before they enter epoch $e + 1$ or start the recovery procedure. As b' is one such block, $v'' \leq v'$. Let Q_2 be a stage 2 QC for b that is seen by an honest player p_2 before disseminating a stage 3 vote during view v . Then (Q_2, Q_1) is a certificate of guilt for epoch e since, by our choice of v'' , $\text{vprev}(Q_1) < v$.

It remains to show that Q_1 and Q_2 will be seen by all active honest players by time $t + 2\Delta^*$. If some first honest player enters epoch $e + 1$ or starts the recovery procedure at timeslot t , then all active honest players do so by $t + \Delta^*$. This means p_i (for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, as specified above) must enter epoch $e + 1$ or start the recovery procedure by $t + \Delta^*$. Player p_i must therefore have seen Q_i

before $t + \Delta^*$, and so Q_i must be seen by all active honest players by time $t + 2\Delta^*$. All active honest players therefore see Q_1 and Q_2 by time $t + 2\Delta^*$, as required. $\square$

The validating stake. Recall that $\mathcal{M}^*$ is the set of all messages disseminated during an execution. Suppose there exists a unique $\mathcal{M}^*$ -confirmed block b that is epoch e ending. By the *validating stake* for epoch $e + 1$, we mean the set of identifiers id such that $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \text{Tr}(b), id) > 0$.

LEMMA 9.3.

PosT is consistent for ρ -bounded adversaries when $\rho < 1/3$.

Proof.

This follows almost directly from Lemmas 9.1 and 9.2. Suppose the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1/3$ and that there exists a least epoch e that sees a consistency violation, i.e., such that incompatible blocks b and b' with $\mathbf{e}(b) = \mathbf{e}(b') = e$ are both $\mathcal{M}^*$ -confirmed. Because QCs for blocks in epoch e require votes from at least $2/3$ of the validating stake for epoch e , any certificate of guilt implicates at least $1/3$ of the validating stake for epoch e . By Lemma 9.2, $\mathcal{M}^*$ contains a certificate of guilt for epoch e , which implicates at least $1/3$ of the validating stake for epoch e . By Lemma 9.1, all the implicated identifiers must be Byzantine. This gives the required contradiction. $\square$

9.7. Establishing liveness.

Suppose the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1/3$. Lemma 9.3 establishes consistency in this case, which means that if two honest players are in the same epoch e , then their local values $\mathbf{lead}(\mathcal{M}, e, v)$ agree for all v . We may therefore refer unambiguously to the value $\mathbf{lead}(e, v)$ for each e, v . Let k^* take the minimum value ≥ 1 such that, for any e and v (and in any execution, given that the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1/3$), at least one $v' \in (v, v + k^*]$ must satisfy the condition that $\mathbf{lead}(e, v')$ is honest. Note that k^* is a function of x^* (the maximum number of validators) but is independent of Δ^* .

LEMMA 9.4.

Suppose the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1/3$. Then the protocol is live with respect to a liveness parameter T_l that is $O(k^ \Delta)$.*

Proof.

The proof shows (essentially) that each honest leader after GST confirms a new block of transactions but is complicated slightly by transitions at the end of an epoch. Recall that, by the assumptions of the quasi-permissionless setting, honest validators are always active.

Suppose the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1/3$. As noted above, we can refer unambiguously to the value $\mathbf{lead}(e, v)$ for each e, v . Suppose that the environment sends a transaction $\mathbf{tr}$ to an honest player at t , and let $t_0 = \max\{t, \text{GST}\} + \Delta$. Let e be the greatest epoch that any honest player is in at t_0 , and suppose that all active honest players are in view v_0 at t_0 . Let $v_1 > v_0$ be the least such that $\mathbf{lead}(e, v_1)$ is honest (noting that $v_1 \leq v_0 + k^*$). There are now various possibilities to consider. If no honest player enters epoch $e + 1$ by timeslot $4v_1\Delta + 3\Delta$, then let Q^+ be the lock amongst honest players at time $4v_1\Delta - \Delta$ such that $\mathbf{v}(Q^+)$ is greatest. The leader for view v_1 will receive Q^+ and $\mathbf{tr}$ by time $4v_1\Delta$. Assuming $\mathbf{tr}$ has not already been confirmed, this leader will therefore propose a block containing $\mathbf{tr}$ that is admissible for all honest players (when they judge admissibility at timeslot $4v_1\Delta + \Delta$, line 16 of Algorithm 1). All honest players will then produce stage 1, 2, and 3 votes for that block b (lines 18, 25, and 31 of Algorithm 1), and b will be confirmed by the end of view v_1 .

If $\mathbf{h}(b) \leq (e + 1)x$, then $\mathbf{tr}$ will also be confirmed by the end of view v_1 , and so the argument is complete in that case. If either $\mathbf{h}(b) > (e + 1)x$ or some honest player enters epoch $e + 1$ before timeslot $4v_1\Delta + 3\Delta$, all honest players will be in epoch $e + 1$ by timeslot $4(v_1 + 1)\Delta$. In this case, let $v_2 > v_1 + 1$ be the least such that $\mathbf{lead}(e + 1, v_2)$ is honest (noting that $v_2 \leq v_1 + 1 + k^*$). Then all honest players will be in epoch $e + 1$ for the entirety of view v_2 . Let Q^+ be the lock amongst honest players at time $4v_2\Delta - \Delta$ such that $\mathbf{v}(Q^+)$ is greatest. The leader for view v_2 will receive Q^+ and $\mathbf{tr}$ by time $4v_2\Delta$. Assuming $\mathbf{tr}$ has not already been confirmed, this leader will therefore propose a block containing $\mathbf{tr}$ that is admissible for all honest players at timeslot $4v_2\Delta + \Delta$. All honest players will then produce stage 1, 2, and 3 votes for that block, and the block (and $\mathbf{tr}$) will be confirmed by the end of view v_2 . $\square$

9.8. Proving that the recovery procedure carries out slashing.

LEMMA 9.5.

Suppose the adversary is ρ^ -bounded for $\rho^* < 2/3$ and that all message delays prior to GST are at most Δ^* . If a consistency violation occurs in some least epoch e , then the execution of the recovery procedure ensures the existence of a unique updated genesis block b'_g such that the following hold:*

- $\text{Tr}(b'_g)$ contains a certificate of guilt that implicates at least $1/3$ of the validating stake for epoch e .
- b'_g receives output votes from more than half the validating stake for epoch e that is not implicated by certificates of guilt in $\text{Tr}(b'_g)$.

Proof.

The argument resembles that in section 9.2. We again use the fact, implied by the assumptions of the quasi-permissionless setting, that honest validators are always active.

Assume the conditions in the statement of the lemma, and let b be an epoch $e - 1$ ending block that is $\mathcal{M}^*$ -confirmed. Because e is the least epoch in which a consistency violation occurs, b is uniquely determined. Set $\mathbf{T} := \text{Tr}(b)$. Let $id_0, \dots, id_{k-1}$ be the enumeration of the identifiers id such that $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{T}, id) > 0$ as specified in section 9.5, and set $\mathbf{Id} := \{id_0, \dots, id_{k-1}\}$. Let P be the set of players with identifiers in $\mathbf{Id}$. For $i \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$, define $\text{reclead}(i)$ to be the identifier id_j , where $j = i \bmod k$. Note that $\text{reclead}(i) = \text{reclead}(M, i)$; however, M is locally defined during the recovery procedure for honest $p \in P$.

For each $i \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 0}$, let t_i be as defined in Algorithm 2, so that the i th instance of Dolev–Strong begins at time t_i . Note that the recovery procedure might not be triggered by time t_i . If $p = \text{reclead}(i)$ is honest, and if p has not received a certificate of guilt for epoch e by t_i , then $O_{p'}$ will remain empty for every honest $p' \in P$ during the i th instance of Dolev–Strong, and no honest player in P will output a vote in this instance. If $p = \text{reclead}(i)$ is honest, and if p has received a certificate of guilt for epoch e by t_i and has not terminated the recovery procedure by time t_i , then p will disseminate a genesis proposal (b'_g, i) which is M -admissible (line 10 of Algorithm 2), where M is as locally defined for any honest $p' \in P$ during the recovery procedure. $\text{Tr}(b'_g)$ will contain a certificate of guilt $\mathbf{G}$ implicating at least $1/3$ of the validating stake for epoch e . Every honest player $p' \in P$ will trigger the recovery procedure by time $t_i + \Delta^*$ and will enumerate this single value (b'_g, i) into $O_{p'}$ during this instance of Dolev–Strong (line 16 of Algorithm 2). All honest players in P will then produce output votes for b'_g in this instance. Since the honest players control a majority of the validating stake for epoch e that is not implicated by $\mathbf{G}$ (using that $\rho^* < 2/3$), b'_g receives output votes from more than half the validating stake for epoch e that is not implicated by certificates of guilt in $\text{Tr}(b'_g)$.

If $p = \text{reclead}(i)$ is Byzantine and if $p' \in P$ is honest and enumerates some value into $O_{p'}$ during the i th instance of Dolev–Strong, it remains to show that every honest $p'' \in P$ will do the

same. This suffices to show that either all honest players in P will vote for a common updated genesis block and end the recovery procedure, or none will. The argument is the same as in section 9.2. There are two cases to consider:

- **Case 1.** Suppose that some honest $p' \in P$ first enumerates y into $O_{p'}$ (via line 16 of Algorithm 2) at time $t_i + j\Delta^*$ with $j < k$. In this case, p' receives a message of the form $m = y_{id'_1, \dots, id'_j} \in \mathbf{Signed}(M, i, j)$ at $t_i + j\Delta^*$. Player p' then adds their signature to form a message with $j + 1$ distinct signatures and disseminates this message. This means every honest player $p'' \in P$ will enumerate y into $O_{p''}$ by time $(j + 1)\Delta^*$.
- **Case 2.** Suppose next that some honest p' first enumerates y into $O_{p'}$ at time $t_i + k\Delta^*$. In this case, p' receives a message of the form $m = y_{id'_1, \dots, id'_k} \in \mathbf{Signed}(M, i, k)$ at time $t_i + k\Delta^*$, which has k distinct signatures attached. At least one of those signatures must be from an honest player p'' , meaning that Case 1 applies w.r.t. p'' . $\square$

A further relaxation of the synchrony assumption. As foreshadowed in footnote 24, bounded message delays are required only during a limited period around the time of an attack. Specifically, suppose there exists a consistency violation in some least epoch e . Let t_0^* be the least timeslot at which some honest player enters epoch $e + 1$ or triggers the recovery procedure. While the statements of Lemmas 9.2 and 9.5 assume for the sake of simplicity that message delays prior to GST are always bounded by Δ^* , the following weaker assumption suffices for the proofs: If p disseminates a message at any timeslot t_1^* , and if honest p' is active at $t_2^* := \max\{t_1^*, t_0^*\} + \Delta^*$, then p' receives that message at a timeslot $\leq t_2^*$. The original model introduced in section 5 corresponds to taking $t_0^* = 0$ in the condition above.

9.9. Completing the proof of Theorem 5.1: Establishing the EAAC property.

To complete the proof of Theorem 5.1, we specify t_f , as well as the investment and valuation functions.

Defining t_f . If there is a consistency violation in some least epoch e , let t_f be any timeslot after which all honest players active during epoch e have terminated the recovery procedure and outputted an updated genesis block b'_g . By Lemma 9.5, such a timeslot t_f exists, and b'_g is uniquely defined and can be determined from the locally defined M values of active honest players at t_f .

The canonical PoS investment function. Let C be the cost of each unit of stake. To specify $\mathbf{R}(p, t)$, we define $\mathbf{R}(id, t)$ for each identifier id and then set $\mathbf{R}(p, t) = \sum_{id \in \text{id}(p)} \mathbf{R}(id, t)$. The rough idea is that a player's investment should correspond to the value of their validating stake, the value of any of their stake which is no longer validating but remains in escrow, and the value of any of their stake which was lost to slashing. Formally, for a timeslot t , denote by $e(t)$ the greatest epoch such that, for

all $e \leq e(t)$, there exists a unique epoch e ending block that is confirmed for some honest player at t . (If no such epoch exists, define $b_1(t)$ and $b_2(t)$ as the genesis block.) Let $b_1(t)$ be the unique epoch $e(t)$ ending block that is confirmed for some honest player at t , and let $b_2(t)$ be the unique epoch $e(t) - 1$ ending block that is confirmed for some honest player at t . (Or if $e(t) = 0$, define $b_2(t)$ as the genesis block.) First, suppose that no honest player has triggered the recovery procedure by t . Then, if either

- i. the identifier is currently a validator (i.e., $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{Tr}(b_1(t)), id) > 0$);
- ii. the identifier no longer controls a validator, but their stake has not yet been removed from escrow (i.e., $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}^*, \mathbf{Tr}(b_2(t)), id) > 0$); or
- iii. the identifier that has been slashed (i.e., $\mathbf{Tr}(b_1(t))$) includes a certificate of guilt implicating id ,

we define $\mathbf{R}(id, t) = N/x^*$; otherwise, $\mathbf{R}(id, t) = 0$.

Now suppose that some honest player has triggered the recovery procedure by t , due to a consistency violation in epoch $e(t) + 1$. Here, because the validating stake from epoch $e(t) - 1$ need not still be in escrow, we consider only $b_1(t)$. That is, we define $\mathbf{R}(id, t) = N/x^*$ if (i) or (iii) holds, and $\mathbf{R}(id, t) = 0$ otherwise.

This investment function is Γ -liquid in the sense of section 3.2, provided Γ is chosen to be larger than the maximum time needed to complete an epoch after GST (which is proportional to $\Delta \cdot x > \Delta^*$).

The canonical valuation function. If there is no consistency violation at timeslots $\leq t$, then, for any set of players P , we define the valuation function as the value (at the market price C) of the investments made (and not already recouped) by P :

$$v(P, t, \{\mathbf{R}(p, t)\}_{p \in P}, C, \mathcal{M})) := \sum_{p \in P} \mathbf{R}(p, t) \cdot C,$$

where $\mathcal{M}$ specifies the sets of messages received by each player by timeslot t in the execution.

In the event of a consistency violation, the valuation function should discount stake that has been slashed. Formally, consider a consistency violation and let t_f and b'_g be as specified above. Let $\mathbf{Id}$ be the set of identifiers that are not implicated by any certificates of guilt in $\mathbf{Tr}(b'_g)$. For any set of players P and $t \geq t_f$, we set

$$v(P, t, \{\mathbf{R}(p, t)\}_{p \in P}, C, \mathcal{M})) := \sum_{p \in P} \sum_{id \in \text{id}(p) \cap \text{Id}} \mathbf{R}(id, t) \cdot C,$$

where $\mathcal{M}$ specifies the sets of messages received by each player by timeslot t in the execution. This valuation function is consistency-respecting in the sense of section 3.2. (It is generally undefined following a consistency violation, up until the timeslot t_f at which the recovery procedure completes.)

Because Lemma 9.1 establishes that certificates of guilt can implicate only Byzantine identifiers, condition (a) in Definition 3.1 is satisfied. By Lemma 9.5, in the case of a consistency violation in some least epoch e , $\mathbf{Tr}(b'_g)$ contains certificates of guilt for at least $1/3$ of the validating stake for epoch e , so condition (b) in Definition 3.1 is also satisfied and the protocol is (α, ρ, ρ^*) -EAAC for $\alpha = \max\{0, (\rho^* - \frac{1}{3})/\rho^*\}$.

Weakening liveness requirements to achieve the EAAC property for larger adversaries. Thus far, we have supposed that the protocol is required to be live so long as the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1/3$. If the protocol is only required to be live for adversaries that are ρ_l -bounded (for some $\rho_l < 1/3$), then a simple modification suffices to ensure the protocol is EAAC with respect to the canonical investment and valuation functions when the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1 - \rho_l$. To describe the appropriate modification (which uses ideas explored in many previous papers, e.g., [41, 38]), consider condition (iv) from the definition of a quorum certificate in section 9.4, and suppose we require instead that $\sum_{V \in Q} \mathbf{c}(V) \geq (1 - \rho_l)\mathbf{N}(b)$. For the proof of Lemma 9.2, we required that every quorum certificate must contain at least one vote from an honest player. With our modified notion of a quorum certificate, these conditions will now hold so long as the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1 - \rho_l$. Since any certificate of guilt now implicates at least a fraction $1 - 2\rho_l$ of the validating stake for epoch e , Lemma 9.3 will now hold under the weaker condition that the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1 - 2\rho_l$. The proof of Lemma 9.4 goes through unchanged, so long as the adversary is ρ_l -bounded. The proof of section 9.8 also goes through unchanged.

How is the impossibility result in Theorem 4.2 avoided? As discussed at the end of section 8, the proof of Theorem 4.2 shows that non-trivial EAAC protocols are possible only if the protocol's liveness parameter or the investment function's liquidity parameter scales with the worst-case message delay. In Theorem 5.1, crucially, we do assume a finite bound Δ^* on the worst-case message delay. The liveness parameter T_l of the protocol scales only with Δ and the maximum number x^* of validators and thus may be arbitrarily smaller than the worst-case message delay Δ^* . The canonical PoS investment function, however, is Γ -liquid only for values Γ that exceed the minimum length of

an epoch, which is, by our choice of the number x of blocks per epoch, at least $4\Delta x > 4\Delta^*$ timeslots. This delay, combined with our use of three stages of voting (and using the fact that $\rho^* < 2/3$), allows us to ensure that any consistency violation is seen by honest players before those responsible for it can cash out of their positions (with honest players learning of a consistency violation in epoch e within $2\Delta^*$ timeslots of any honest player completing the epoch).

Appendix A. Modeling PoW in Bitcoin.

In this section, we show how to model proof-of-work, as used in the Bitcoin protocol, using the permitter formalism. The basic idea is that, at each timeslot, a player should be able to request permission to publish a certain block, with the permitter response depending on the player's resource balance (i.e., hashrate). To integrate properly with the "difficulty adjustment" algorithm used by the Bitcoin protocol to regulate the average rate of block production (even as the total hashrate devoted to the protocol fluctuates), we define the permitter oracle so that its responses can have varying "quality." Each PoW oracle response will be a 256-bit string τ , and we can regard the quality of τ as the number of 0s that it begins with.

An example. As an example, suppose that $\mathbf{R}^O(p, t) = 5$. Then p might send a single query $(5, \sigma)$ at timeslot t , and this should be thought of as a request for a PoW for σ (which could represent a block proposal, for example). If p does not get the response that it's looking for, it might, at a later timeslot t' with $\mathbf{R}^O(p, t') = 5$, send another query $(5, \sigma)$ to the PoW oracle.

Formal details. We consider a single-use permitter. All queries to the permitter must be of the form (b, σ) , where σ is any finite string. As already stipulated in section 2.3, the fact that O is a single-use permitter means that p can send the queries $(b_1, \sigma_1), \dots, (b_k, \sigma_k)$ at the same timeslot t only if $\sum_{i=1}^k b_i \leq \mathbf{R}^O(p, t)$. If p submits the query (b, σ) to the permitter at t , then the permitter independently samples b -many 256-bit strings uniformly at random and lets τ be the lexicographically smallest of these sampled strings. Player p then receives the response $r := (\sigma, \tau)$ signed by the oracle.

Acknowledgments.

We thank the EC and SICOMP reviewers for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this work.

Footnotes

¹ See <https://ethereum.org/developers/docs/consensus-mechanisms/pos>.

- 2 | This version of the theorem statement assumes that the protocol is required to be live when the adversary is ρ -bounded for $\rho < 1/3$. The full theorem statement in section 4 generalizes the result to consider weaker liveness requirements.

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- 3 | Later in this section (and in more detail in section 9), we will discuss how the $2/3$ bound can be improved by reducing liveness requirements.

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- 4 | One interpretation of the parameter Δ^* is as the speed of communication through social channels, as referenced in, for example, Buterin’s discussion of “weak subjectivity” [7].

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- 5 | Because typical longest-chain protocols are designed to be consistent and live in the dynamically available setting, Theorem 4.1 applies to them and rules out provable slashing guarantees. Protocols that rely only on off-chain resources must effectively operate in the dynamically available setting, and thus Theorem 4.1 again applies.

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- 6 | In more detail, there is a separation between the property of achieving consensus on slashing conditions and the EAAC property that we define. In partial synchrony with an adversary large enough to cause consistency violations, it is possible to generate certificates of guilt identifying Byzantine participants and then reach consensus on a post-slashing state. What is not possible is ensuring that this consensus is reached before the adversary liquidates its position, which is exactly what the EAAC property requires. This is the critical role played by economic considerations in Theorem 4.2.

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- 7 | Formally, a “setting” is a set of executions. “In a given setting” means “restricting attention to executions in the setting.” An execution is “consistent with a given setting” if it is a member of the corresponding set of executions.

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- 8 | Once active, they are assumed to eventually receive all the messages that they missed. In practice, newly active players could potentially recover past messages through a combination of public sources and queries to other players or third-party archival services.

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- 9 While one might suppose that honest players are incentivized by inflationary rewards (e.g., block rewards or staking rewards paid out in newly minted coins by the protocol to those that appear to run it honestly) and Byzantine players are motivated by off-chain gains (e.g., profit from a double-spend attack or a judiciously chosen short position), we do not attempt to microfound why a given player might choose to be honest or Byzantine.

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- 10 The upper bound $R_{\max}^O$ on the total resource balance can be very loose, for example representing all of the silicon on planet Earth.

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- 11 These are important only in the proof of Theorem 4.2. They hold for the Post protocol described in section 5.1 and would presumably be satisfied by any reasonable PoS protocol.

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- 12 For example, if a stake allocation function represents native cryptocurrency, $\mathbf{T}$ could comprise payments transferring all stake initially owned by identifiers in I to identifiers outside of I . If the stake allocation function tracks stake-in-escrow, $\mathbf{T}$ could include one unstaking transaction for each $id \in I$.

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- 13 For example, a simple payment between two identifiers outside of I would presumably be a benign transaction.

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- 14 Roughly, the proofs of these results have various steps that rely on the assumed correctness of the given protocol (en route to an eventual contradiction). Given a protocol that is guaranteed to be correct only with some probability $\geq 1 - \epsilon$, each of these steps goes through except with at most ϵ probability. If a proof has k such steps, then the proof goes through except with $k \cdot \epsilon$ probability. Thus, so as long as $\epsilon < 1/k$, the proofs continue to produce the desired contradiction.

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- 15 Note that the definition of the partially synchronous model (section 2.1) implies that a just-now-active player will, assuming GST has passed, immediately know about every message that was sent more than Δ timesteps

ago.

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- 16 That is, we allow the correctness of the protocol to be conditioned on the assumption that a non-zero number of the players with on-chain resource balances are active. By “participating” we mean “is active.” By “level of participation” we mean the fraction (in terms of resource balances) of the players that are active.

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- 17 This assumption is minimal in the sense that if all players with non-zero stake can be inactive, then the stake distribution plays no role (and so, for example, any impossibility results for the fully permissionless setting would immediately apply).

Additional assumptions about the fraction of stake controlled by active honest players are phrased using the notion of ρ -bounded adversaries from section 2.6.

- 18 For example, the various Bitmain Antminers (one of the dominant machines for Bitcoin mining) are specific to the SHA-256 hash function and cannot be used for the keccak-256 hash function (which was used in Ethereum back when it was a proof-of-work protocol).

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- 19 As an aside, the “flow cost of an attack” discussed in section 1.4 would then be defined as $\sum_{p \in B} \sum_{i=1}^k \sum_{t=1}^{t_f} c_i \cdot \mathbf{R}_i(p, t)$, where B denotes the attacking players and the c_i ’s are defined as in that section.

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- 20 Without this requirement, a protocol could achieve the EAAC property by addressing only the first two challenges below Figure 4 and not the third. For example, the valuation function could be defined to discount any stake implicated by some certificate of guilt known to some honest player, even while honest players disagree on what the “post-slashing” state should be.

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- 21 See section 9.9 for the precise definition used in the proof of Theorem 5.1.

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- 22 For the purposes of inequalities (4) and (5), we interpret an undefined valuation function as $+\infty$.

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- 23 While “1” is arguably the most natural threshold when using these ratios to define “expensive” and “collapse,” a different constant $x \in (0, 1)$ could be used instead. Our impossibility results would then hold, with essentially the same proofs, for any choice of x .

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- 24 We note also that our proof of Theorem 5.1 only requires that message delays prior to GST are bounded by Δ^* for a limited period around the time of an attack. This observation is made precise in section 9.

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- 25 The fact that Δ^* may be much larger than T_l means that a protocol aiming to be (ρ, ρ^*) -EAAC cannot ignore Δ and simply assume that message delays will always be bounded by Δ^* .

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- 26 Sometimes we may also refer to an *identifier* that has non-zero validating stake according to the transactions confirmed for any honest player as a validator, but this will not result in confusion because it will be clear from the context whether we are referring to a player or an identifier.

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- 27 HotStuff [47] also makes use of three stages of voting in each view, but, as explained in section 9.3, the motivation in that case is rather different.

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- 28 For simplicity, our protocol description and analysis conclude with the successful agreement by honest players on a post-slashing state following a consistency violation. This suffices to establish the EAAC property and prove Theorem 5.1. More generally, the protocol could be run repeatedly, triggering the recovery procedure as needed to punish a consistency violation and produce a new genesis block for the next instance of the protocol.

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- 29 The definition of a Γ -liquid investment function allows a player to cash out after *some* honest player sees a zero balance on-chain for at least Γ consecutive time steps; here, in fact, *all* honest players witness this.

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30 If one wanted to drop this assumption of the model, then one would need to augment the proof given here so as to implement an appropriately modified version of some standard protocol for view synchronization (e.g., [37]). We avoid such matters, as complicating the proof in this way would distract from the primary considerations of the paper.

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31 In fact, the time to complete each view will be 4Δ once we add in an extra stage of voting for each view.

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32 To see the issue, suppose b' and b'' are both blocks of height $> (e + 1)x$ which are produced during epoch e , such that b'' is a child of b' , and which both receive stage 2 QCs; this is possible because the stage 2 QC for b'' may be produced during asynchrony before GST and before any player has seen the stage 2 QC for b' . If we were to regard the transactions in b' and b'' as confirmed, then some of the new validators may initially see b'' as confirmed, while most have only seen a stage 2 QC for b' . The new validators might then confirm new blocks that are descendants of b' incompatible with b'' .

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33 One concrete difference between the protocols is that, with a ρ -bounded adversary with $\rho < 1/3$, stage 2 QCs for conflicting blocks are possible in the HotStuff protocol but impossible in the PosT protocol.

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34 Throughout this paper, we use “*” to denote concatenation.

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35 While a remove-from-escrow transaction impacts a player’s $\mathcal{S}$ -balance immediately at the end of an epoch, the stake should be considered as remaining in escrow for one further epoch; this will be reflected in the definitions of the investment and valuation functions in section 9.9. (There are alternative approaches that achieve the same goals, for example to use two distinct stake allocation functions to separate validating stake and stake that is in escrow but has been marked for removal from escrow.)

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36 As will subsequently become clear, this choice of x ensures that every validator will be leader for at least one (in fact, two) views in each epoch.

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37 Thus, a block whose parent is epoch e ending can still belong to the same epoch. This is due to the considerations outlined in section 9.3; i.e., further blocks may need to be built in the same epoch so as to confirm the block that is epoch e ending. Once that block b is confirmed, the first blocks of the next epoch will be children of b .

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38 This condition is important because epoch transactions inform S of the end of an epoch.

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39 Once an honest player p sees that the recovery procedure has been triggered and has terminated, outputting a new genesis block b'_g , it is technically convenient for p to regard b'_g as the only confirmed block. If a consistency violation occurs in some least epoch e , then b'_g will contain all transactions confirmed by the end of epoch $e - 1$.

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40 Generally, we write $x \uparrow$ to indicate that the variable x is undefined, and we write $x \downarrow$ to indicate that x is defined.

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41 The starting timeslot of $4\Delta((e + 2)x + 1)$ is chosen to be sufficiently late that all the required honest players will begin together.

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* An extended abstract of this work appeared in *Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation* (EC).

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Fast Distributed Agreement

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[Abstract](#) +

We describe a Byzantine Agreement algorithm, with early stopping, for systems with arbitrary process failures. The algorithm presented is simpler and more efficient than those previously known. It was derived using a broadcast primitive that provides properties of message authentication and thus restricts the disruptive behavior of faulty processes. This primitive is a general tool for deriving fault-tolerant algorithms in the presence of arbitrary failures.

A Tight Space Bound for Consensus

Leqi Zhu

[Abstract](#) +

In the *consensus* problem, there are n processes that each has a private input value. Each nonfaulty process must output a single value such that no two processes output different values and the output is the input value of some process. There are many consensus protocols for systems where the processes may only communicate by reading and writing to shared registers. Of particular interest are protocols that have progress guarantees such as randomized wait-freedom or obstruction-freedom. In 1992, it was proved that such protocols must use $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ registers. In 2015, this was improved to $\Omega(n)$ registers in the *anonymous* setting, where processes do not have identifiers. We prove that every randomized wait-free or obstruction-free protocol for solving consensus among n processes must use at least $n-1$ registers.

Determining Consensus Numbers

Eric Ruppert

[Abstract](#) +

Conditions on a shared object type T are given that are both necessary and sufficient for wait-free n -process consensus to be solvable using objects of type T and registers. The conditions apply to two large classes of deterministic shared objects: read-

modify-write objects [C. P. Kruskal, L. Rudolph, and M. Snir, { *ACM Trans. Prog. Lang. Syst.*, 10 (1988), pp. 579--601] and readable objects, which have operations that allow processes to read the state of the object. These classes include most objects that are used as the primitives of distributed systems. When the sequential specification of T is finite, the conditions may be checked in a finite amount of time to decide the question "Is the consensus number of T at least n ?" The conditions are also used to provide a clear proof of the robustness of the consensus hierarchy for read-modify-write and readable objects.

Flipping Persuasively in Constant Time

Cynthia Dwork ,David Shmoys ,Larry Stockmeyer

Abstract +

A persuasive coin is a sufficiently unbiased source of randomness visible to sufficiently many processors in a distributed system. An algorithm is described for achieving a persuasive coin in the presence of an extremely powerful adversary where the number of rounds of message exchange among the processors is constant, independent of the number n of processors in the system as well as the number of faults, provided the total number of faulty processors does not exceed a certain constant multiple of $n/\log n$. As a corollary an $\Omega(n/\log n)$ -resilient probabilistic protocol for Byzantine agreement running in constant expected time is obtained. Combining this with a generalization of a technique of Bracha, a probabilistic Byzantine agreement protocol tolerant of almost $(n/4)$ failures with $O(\log \log n)$ expected running time is obtained.

An Optimal Probabilistic Protocol for Synchronous Byzantine Agreement

Pesech Feldman ,Silvio Micali

Abstract +

Broadcasting guarantees the recipient of a message that everyone else has received the same message. This guarantee no longer exists in a setting in which all communication is person-to-person and some of the people involved are untrustworthy: though he may claim to send the same message to everyone, an untrustworthy sender may send different messages to different people. In such a setting, Byzantine agreement offers the "best alternative" to broadcasting. Thus far, however, reaching Byzantine agreement has required either many rounds of communication (i.e., messages had to be sent back and forth a number of times that grew with the size of the network) or the help of some external trusted party.

In this paper, for the standard communication model of synchronous networks in which each pair of processors is connected by a private communication line, we exhibit a protocol that, in probabilistic polynomial time and without relying on any external trusted party, reaches Byzantine agreement in an expected constant number of rounds and in the worst natural fault model. In fact, our protocol successfully tolerates that up to $1/3$ of the processors in the network may deviate from their prescribed instructions in an arbitrary way, cooperate with each other, and perform arbitrarily long computations.

Our protocol effectively demonstrates the power of randomization and zero-knowledge computation against errors. Indeed, it proves that "privacy" (a fundamental ingredient of one of our primitives), even when is not a desired goal in itself (as for the Byzantine agreement problem), can be a crucial tool for achieving correctness.

Our protocol also introduces three new primitives---graded broadcast, graded verifiable secret sharing, and oblivious common coin---that are of independent interest, and may be effectively used in more practical protocols than ours.

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