High-Frequency Trading and the Design of Financial Markets
/in Bitcoin and blockchain, financial market design, Public Talk, public talks, Research talks, Research TalksDiscussion of ‘Would Order-by-Order Auctions be Competitive?’ at the SEC, 10th Annual Conference on Financial Market Regulation, May 2023
/in policy writing, public talks, Publication Type, Research PolicyA Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?
/in Featured Recent, financial market design, patents and innovation, published papers, Research Papers, Research PapersComment Letter on SEC Retail Investor Auctions Proposal
/in Policy Writing, policy writing, Research PolicyFinancial Market Design
/in Research Area, Research Papers, Research Policy, Research talks, test research themesThis page collects my work related to financial market design. My best known conceptual ideas in this area are frequent batch auctions and sniping. Frequent batch auctions is a market design alternative to continuous trading on financial exchanges. Mathematically, instead of trading in continuous time as a serial process — which means that being a nanosecond faster is treated as economically meaningful by the market design — trade is in discrete time as a batch process, using auctions. Sniping refers to arbitrage that is primarily a contest in speed, also known as picking off stale quotes. Mathematically, sniping refers to arbitrage rents that arise from symmetric public information — information that is broadly disseminated to the whole market at the same time — as distinct from asymmetric private information.
Quantifying the High-Frequency Trading “Arms Race”
/in Featured Recent, financial market design, published papers, Research PapersMarket Design
/in Course allocation, financial market design, published papers, Survey Articles, ticket marketsEric Budish
Paul G. McDermott Professor of Economics and Entrepreneurship
Centel Foundation/Robert P. Reuss Faculty Scholar