A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?
/in Featured Recent, financial market design, patents and innovation, published papers, Research Papers, Research PapersFinancial Market Design
/in Research Area, Research Papers, Research Policy, Research talks, test research themesThis page collects my work related to financial market design. My best known conceptual ideas in this area are frequent batch auctions and sniping. Frequent batch auctions is a market design alternative to continuous trading on financial exchanges. Mathematically, instead of trading in continuous time as a serial process — which means that being a nanosecond faster is treated as economically meaningful by the market design — trade is in discrete time as a batch process, using auctions. Sniping refers to arbitrage that is primarily a contest in speed, also known as picking off stale quotes. Mathematically, sniping refers to arbitrage rents that arise from symmetric public information — information that is broadly disseminated to the whole market at the same time — as distinct from asymmetric private information.
Quantifying the High-Frequency Trading “Arms Race”
/in Featured Recent, financial market design, published papers, Research PapersThe High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response
/in financial market design, published papers, Research PapersImplementation Details for Frequent Batch Auctions: Slowing Down Markets to the Blink of an Eye
/in financial market design, published papers, Related Works, Research PapersEric Budish
Paul G. McDermott Professor of Economics and Entrepreneurship
Centel Foundation/Robert P. Reuss Faculty Scholar