Course Allocation

This page collects my work on the market design problem of course allocation, also known as multi-unit or combinatorial assignment. My best known conceptual ideas in this area are the course allocation mechanism “Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes” (A-CEEI) and the associated approximate fairness and incentives criteria: Envy Bounded by a Single Good (EF-1), Maximin Share (MMS), and Strategy-proof in the Large (SP-L).

Confusingly, my papers developing A-CEEI were published in reverse chronological order (our profession’s beautiful publication process). I recommend reading the early papers in the order Budish and Cantillon (2012), then Budish (2011), then Othman et al (2010).

A good summary of my overall methodological approach is in the essay “Matching ‘versus’ Mechanism Design.”

The A-CEEI mechanism is now used in practice for course allocation at several leading universities. The company behind this is Cognomos. The research that helped bring A-CEEI from theory to practice is the 2017 Operations Research paper and the 2021 Management Science paper.