Strategy proof

This page collects my work on market design theory. Readers may also wish to look at the page specifically on the course allocation problem, which has significant overlap.

I recently wrote a survey article on Market Design with Nikhil Agarwal for the Handbook of Industrial Organization. That could be a helpful orientation for graduate students or other researchers interested in this area more broadly.

Selected Materials

Research Papers

Strategy-proofness in the Large

Coauthors: Eduardo M Azevedo
Review of Economic Studies, (2019): 86, no. 1, 81-116.
Seminar Slides (Nov 2012)
ACM EC Panel Discussion Slides (June 2018)
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Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications

Coauthors: Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom
American Economic Review, (2013): 103, no. 2, 585-623.
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The Multi-Unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard

Coauthors: Estelle Cantillon
American Economic Review, (2012): 102, no. 5, 2237-2271.
Slides, Jerusalem Summer School (Summer 2014)
Slides, Columbia Seminar (Nov 2009)
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The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes

Journal of Political Economy, (2011): 119, no. 6, 1061-1103.
Wikipedia entry: Maximin share
Wharton “Course Match” website
Slides, Jerusalem Summer School (Summer 2014)
Job Market Talk Slides (Feb 2009)
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Survey Articles

Market Design

Coauthors: Nikhil Agarwal
Handbook of Industrial Organization, 5, Issue 1, 2021, Pages 1-79.
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Matching “Versus” Mechanism Design

ACM SIGecom Exchanges, (2012): 11, no. 2, 4-15.
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